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A COMPARISON OF THE MAIN POINTS DISCUSSED IN
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORIES OP BORDEN PARKER
BOWNE AND HENRI BERGSON.
INTRODUCTION.
Aim of dissertation.
To indicate the general trend of the two
systems of philosophy by a comparison of
their main points of contrast with re-
ference to epistemology.
CHAPTER I.
GENESIS OF CONTRASTED EPISTEMOLOGIES .
A. Main points of Epistemology considered.
1.
(Reactive nature of thought
(Possibility of knowledge. Psychical unity.
P, Subjective factors. Time and Snace.
3. Objective validity of the categories.
B. Brief Historical Survey.
1. The Greeks. Sceptics. Plato and Aristotle.
2. Hume and Kant.
3. French Positivism. Comte.




0. Methods of discussion used by Bowne and Bergson.
1. A_ priori Bowne
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i. Unity of psychical agent.
Formally treated; contra the sensationalists.
ii. Feactive nature of thought.
iii. Dependence on Infinite Wind and Will.
Experimental. Bergson.
”Introduct ion to Metaphysics.**
i. Use of the natural sciences.
ii. *^lntuition** as a possible factor in
knowledge.
iii. Bearing of "Intuitionalism** on the relativity
of knowledge. The self; time.
iv. **intuitionalism** and Bowne*s practical reason
compared.
CHAPTER II.
SUBJECTIVE FACTORS IN THOUGHT. SPACE AND TIME.
Discussion limited to the categories treated by both
philosophers.
A . Sna ce
.
1. Considered as a form of thought. Bowne.
Secondary to time. Bergson.
B. Time.
1. Considered from the standpoint of cosmology. Bowne.
2. Considered from the standpoint of psychology. Bergson.
**Time and Free Will.**
a) , intensity of subjective states.
b)
. Quantitative multiplicity. Space end the
mathematical sciences.
. ? X i ' .r? ^ 3 ^ '^o 1 1 nU
9ffJ ;b3^33''f^
. :td^,iioi’^'t 'to STUtf^rr v’/i rx©'’ - U:
.f^iW bns f3Vf’W''»r'I .XiF
”
- :joi ?'^iirf p;.t©M o t loiif iLrbo'Mlrfl”
. s^r'ir 3 j’©?, I»-xxj^an ©'l.t 'to sja^' •!
T ioat oXdXaaon a a a ’’ftoj j.’’ tii
i-t i V X -t a F xio '
b
3 X X 300 j to
.
; 'll 03 o;ii . 3;^.boi •oo/i xo
•»o3'^vi iao i :tc 3'I«7 a ^ on«rc.x bna ^.^lajLia *'0 : 1 X*.Jn- " •/i
Digitized by theMntemet Archive
. :i, vu ;.V:. in''2016 aioru^? a/zrj:;i«-^
bo.'33i'+ aoI'iOJtotno 3f1i "Vt 03.tX:(TXI O':' t SaLf'^^iC
,
Af. f><Tr5
,on'wo-i * trf 'Dorf.t 'to p. 33 b.o'robl^'isOO .f




. ©AV;o3 . V,"-tO.fO.7T3O0 'to ^OXOffbnS^S 9»1«J“ i!TO-i‘l O.OTl9i)X S'lOU •!
. ’^'oloiov.orr to trrxoofo.o ?ta orf.t rao-it b©‘ii?oX3noX
’.IXx'f 00‘ii [;o,3 ecTii”
*3oi3ta ovitoot'Xija to ’^Xian-o.trii. .^3
3:(t biOa ©ostra . 'i.tlo X i ixX la ,1 ^‘-r iS aS . -,o




Qualitative multiplicity. Time treated as
duration. Natural sciences.
d) . "Duration” as related to freedom.
e)
.
Time as duration contrasted with the
Kantian conception.
CHAPTER III.
OBJECTIVE VALIDITY CP THE SUBJECTIVE FACTORS.
The rational and the experimental methods.
A. RATIONAL CRITIQUE. Bowne.
1. Reactive nature of universalizing intelligence.
2. Relation of the physical and the mental.
3. ** — the soul posited by the Infinite.” Con-
comitance. World-Ground.
4. Necessary relativity of rationalism.
B. INTUITIONAL CRITIQUE. Bergson.
1. The physical as ’privileged image among images.’
Actual perception of reality. Bearing on the
metaphysics of matter.
P. Intellect formed under the necessity for action.
Possible bearing on the metaphysics of matter.
3. Body and brain as instruments of thought.
4. Memory and the unitary self. Dualism?
5. Bearing of the above on the relativity of
Knowledge. Objective validity assured.
ChAPTEE IV.
BEARING OF EPISTEMOLOGY ON COSMOLOGY.
Cosmology and the development of epistemology
in Bowne and Bergson.
A. A priori . Bowne.
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• Unity of World-Ground.
.
Personality*
Main interest of Eovne religious and theistic.
Emnirical. Bergson.
"Creative Evolution."
1. The whole as affording a knowledge of the narts.







iii. Man. Intelligence. Limitations of
language imposed on intellect.
iv. Reunion of recovered intuition and
intellect.
7, Imnlicit Theism. Theistic and Religious Interest
wanting.
On the value of the Intuitional Method and the
possibility of philosophy based on a blending
of Rationalism of Eowne and the Intuitionalism
of Bergson.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation aims to indicate the general trend of
the philosophic systems of Henri Bergson and Borden Parker
Bowne. That the discussion may be definite in its contrasts,
the writer has limited himself to a consideration of the main
points in the epistemological methods of these two great think-
ers.
The Kantian theory of thought is conceded to be fundament-
al in both systems. Bowne carries the Kantian rationalism to
its logical conclusion, having cleared up Kant*s mistaken no-
tions with reference to phenomena and having also added to his
discussion of reality the concention of an Infinite World
Ground. Bowne strengthens Kant’s teaching as to the nossible
validity of the "Practical Reason"; but it is a serious question
whether he entirely avoids the relativism necessarily inherent
in the Kantian system.
In order to bring out with sharpness the contrast in
method and ultimate outcome for philosophy our exposition of
the radically new theories of Bergson is made at somewhat great-
er length than seems necessary for the more commonly accepted
theories of Bowne. Bergson’s empiricism is noted with care
for we believe that he has called our attention to an oversight
on the part of many modern thinkers. The vast developments of
biology end zoology demand a consideration which many rational-
ists have failed to give. Bergson asserts that it is imnossible
to understand these sciences and their bearing unon ultimate
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9problems by using the method of the Kantian rationalism. The
system of Kant end his followers was the result of their a
priori study of the purely mathematical sciences. Bergson
uses the imagination, with actual empirical investigation,
and thereby gains an insight into the natural sciences which
the priori method of Kant and his followers must always fail
to give. Hence to the "Critique of the Pure Reason" is added
a "Critique of the Intuitions." In this way Bergson seeks to
avoid the necessary relativism of Kant.
Chanter I . This chanter states only the imnortert points
of Epistemology end traces the genesis of these epistemological
ideas which are discussed by both philosophers. The practical
character of the sys'tem of Eowne as a reaction against current
naturalism is fully recognized. At the same time the writer
of this paper attempts to show the necessity for the empirical
method which Bergson has developed in his doctrine of the In-
tuitions as elaborated in his "Introduction to Metaphysics."
Chapter XI . This chapter considers the treatment of time
and space found in Bowne’s "Metaphysics" end Bergson’s "Time
and Free Will«, The rational discussion of the categories as
’forms of thought’ is put forward by Bowne and the intuitional
conception of time as "duration" is advanced by Bergson. Be-
cause of the widely divergent character of Bergson’s epis-
temology as contrasted with current epistemology, we have out-
lined his position with great care.
Chapter III . This chapter considers the question of the
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relativity of tiiought. The possibly inherent relativity of
Bowne*s rationalism is contrasted with the absolute character
3
of knowledge as afforded by Bergson *s empirical use of the
Intuitions. Bergson’s great work, ’’Matter and Memory” which
contains his elaboration of this question dealing with the ob-
jective validity of the subjective factors of the thought pro-
cess is here reviewed with considerable fulness.
Chanter IV. This chanter makes a still clearer contrast
of the epistemological teaching of these two nhilosonhers by
showing how both have developed their theories largely in con-
tact with the ultimate question of cosmology. Bowne’s ’Per-
sonalism” and Bergson’s ’’Creative Evolution” serve as the
framework of this chapter. Bowne’s main interest is theistic
while Bergson’s interest is only incidentally concerned with
the questions of theism and religion. The logical deduction
of Bergson’s system must however, be interpreted as theistic.
The conclusion of this dissertation is that modern epis-
temological theory will be advanced by a blending of the epis-
temologies of these nhilosophers. We believe that Bergson by
the nroner consideration of the demands made unon our thinking
by the development of the netural sciences, offers to modern
thought a clue as to the further development of the Kantian
epistemology. The a priori and rational should be combined
with the empirical and intuitional in any attempt to reach ulti-
mate conclusions in philosophy or to help solve the practical
concerns of life.
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4CHAPTER I.
GENESIS OP CONTRASTED EPISTEMOLOGIES.
Rational certainty depends not alone upon the rules of
formal logic but also upon the nature of the thought process
itself. Theory of thought or epistemology, is concerned with
the objective validity of knowledge based upon the facts of
sense and elaborated by the understanding. When we study the
unity of the psychical agent, the dependence of knowledge up-
on the subjective factors of the mind and the possible objec-
tive validity of these subjective factors, we are dealing with
epistemological questions of utmost importance for philosoohy.
A review of the history of philosophy reveals the com-
parative modern character of epistemology. Mathematics,
natural forces and astronomy were the major interests of the
early Greeks. They discussed such matters as "the universal
substance" and sought a clearer definition of the Gods.
Greek philosophy turned at first to the Gods as offering an
explanation of the universe; then followed a period of natural-
ism, — a deifying of natural forces; then came an era which
doubted personal existence and even the power of thought,
Plate and Aristotle were concerned mainly with this possible
impeacl'ir.ent of truth or universally valid statement.
In modern times Kume end Kant have made clear the issues
involved in the criticism of the thought instrument. As Kant
has demonstrated, Hume only indicated the general limits of the
understanding and in so doing created a distrust of our faculties.
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Kant sought to show the & priori capacity of the understanding
and thereby discover what were the necessary and final limits
of knowledge.
5
“How is experience possible?" — This question formed the
basis of the Kantian inquiry. The distinct contribution of
the great German was his doctrine that in experience the mind
is not passive but active and constitutive. The empirical
element in experience is not ell; there is a distinct a priori
activity which makes Possible the grasping of the empirical.
Space and time are forms which this structural k priori activity
gives to experience. Kant’s fundamental belief is that ex-
perience is the result of an active synthesizing of the mind.
This does not mean that there is not objective reality
corresponding to the subjective interpretation. Kant never
advanced this theory for he came to the conclusion that there
is a noumenal world back of and in constant relation to the
phenomenal world with which thought has to do, but into which
noumenal world the mind can never enter.
With regard to space and time Kant’s doctrine was that
these are forms of experience not realities in themselves and
relations of “things in themselves" apart from intellect.
"The all embracing character of space means simply the applic-
ability of this law to all external objects. The infinitude
of sPace is only the inexhaustibility of the spatial synthesis.
None of these properties is an adequate perception of objective
fact, but only a reflective implication of a space law.“»
(“Kant and Spencer." Bowne p.38)
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6ivant holds that time is not an empirical concept deducted from
experience, but a necessary representation on which all in-
tuition depends. Time is not a general concept but a pure
form of sensuous intuition, and the original representation
of time must be given as unlimited.
Kant’s discussion evidently ignores the truth that while
the mind must find an external world in accord with its own
laws, yet it may also be true that the law of mind may actual-
ly coincide with the law of an external nature. The experi-
ence of nature must always be subjective but this subjectivity
does not include the unreality of the objective world. While
space and time may be the mind’s form or its manner of reacting
on experience, that fact does not call in question the reality
of space and time or their validity for universal exnerience.
Things in space are only phenomenal and the understanding gives
to these phenomena substantial form and logical relation by ap-
plying the categories of thought to the perceptions of sense.
Apart from phenomena to which they are apllied these categories
have no meaning.
Careful distinction should have pointed out to Kant that
not all knowledge is based on visual or tactual exnerience.
We are constantly correcting our sense impressions, as for ex-
ample in geometry and astronomy. The ultimate conclusions,
while valid, ere far different from unaided sensations and
their perception by the mind. While it is true that such
knowledge applies only to phenomena, the knowledge itself is
not phenomenal but valid and real in the only sense in which
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knowledge can be real. Bowne well says: ”—we must define
phenomena not as appearances or illusions or masks of any kind,
but as something existing only for and through intelligence,
— We apprehend them only through our own intelligence, but
they do not depend uPon our intelligence for their existence—
^
A follower of Kant finds scepticism unavoidable. "Be-
cause objects can exist for us only as they combine or relate
to each other the perceptions or phenomena through which we
know them, it is maintained that we can not know them as they
are; though the universality of the forms of synthesis explain
why we suppose that we do know them as they are, independently
of our perceptions. Hence, the relativity of the objects to
each other is immediately connected with their relativity to
the subject and this relativity to the subject is opposed to
their reality as things-in-themselves.
Kant saw this relativity of his system and endeavored to
correct it by an elaboration of the doctrine of the "Practical
Reason." His criticism of speculative psychology, of specula-
tive cosmology and speculative theology leaves us in agnostic
scepticism. Only when he makes an application of his philoso-
phy to life and deals with the ethical religious problem does
his system become positive.
Ihe two dominant tendencies of the past century were
Romanticism and Positivism. The one starts with the intellect
* ("Kant and Spencer". Bowne. p.l24)
w* ("Philosophy of Kant." Caird vol.I. p.509)
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8and seeks to find out its forms and ideals, to see how
knowledge is possible. The other begins, and seeks to end,
with the facts. In many ways both tendencies are in reality
a reaction against the speculation of the Age of Enlightment,
and make an attempt to found knowledge upon the realities of
nature and human history. The Positivistic tendency arose
as the spirit of Romanticism declined and is not necessarily
to be thought of as in decided opposition thereto.
Comte (1798-1857) drew up the three so-called stages of
thought: the theological stage when human knowledge governs
but a very small portion of the exoerience, and the imagination
plays a most important part; then the metaphysical stage when
the explanation of natural phenomena is no longer found to con-
sist of personal beings, but in universal energies or ideas;
finally, ”the positive stage when both imagination and reflec-
tion are subordinated to experience. The only criterion of
truth consists of agreement with the facts. Positivism does
not however permit the facts to remain in isolation; it seeks
after the laws, that is, the constant relations of the phenomena.
Science builds on the invariability of natural law, which was
anticipated already by the Greeks, but clearly expressed in
modern times by Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, the real founders
of nositive nhilosophy. Our knowledge cannot attain objec-
tive unity, unity is only subjective. Subjective unity con-
sists in the fact that the same method the exnlanation of
facts by facts —- is consistently applied everywhere. This
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^Comte*s positivism is not emniricism. As a matter of
fact the theory of stages presupposes that the facts must al-
ways be combined; the only question is, whence is the combin-
ing instrument to be derived. In the positive stage the com-
bination can be effected in two ways. We associate phenomena
which are given simultaneously according to their similarity
of structure and function. We naturally arrange phenomena
which follow in succession in a temporal series. The former
is a static explanation; the latter is a dynamic explanation.
We satisfy mind’s native impulse for unity by both methods and
thus discover the constant in the midst of change. In his
latter years Comte cam.e to emohasize the subjective character
of our knowledge more and more, until he finally proposed a
subjective system instead of the objective systemf which was first
given.
^
Turning to the English Positivists we find Sir William
Hamilton (1730-1803) consigning philosophy to a docta ignorantia .
To think is to condition, to relate, and hence every item of
knowledge is purely relative. The laws of space, time, degree,
etc., and even the law of causality itself are relative. Hence
the value of philosophy consists in its mental exercises and not
» (^History of Philosophy.” Hoffding. 0.PP6)
("Brief History.” Hoffding. p.2P8
("History of Philosophy". Vol. II. np. 330-338)
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in its thought products.
The system of logic brought forward by John Stuart Mill,
(1306-1873) contains the answer of the English School to Kant’s
’’Critique” and is the last word in empirical epistemology.
Mill sought to show that all knowledge proceeds from experi-
ence; and by experience he means that all perception is due to
a sum of impressions, which sum really constitutes a unity.
There is no unitary self, — the ego is a unity of states. The
law of association is the sunrerae law of inference. The re-
active nature of thought is here entirely lost sight of and
only a mechanical juxtaposition of like exoeriences affords
the unexplained basis of memory and the unity of selfhood.
With the full statement of the theory of evolution which
came in with the middle of the century philosophy follows a new
method. Darwin’s law of the struggle for existence brought
forward an entirely new conception of nature and afforded oppor-
tunity for a naturalistic interpretation of philosophy.
According to Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), nhilosoohy is
unitary knowledge. ’’Its task consists of the discovery of
general principles under which the particular principles pos-
tulated by the snecial sciences can be organized. But this
unitary knowledge can neither be obtained by the a nriori de-
ductive method nor by the simple encyclopedic collation of
facts... Spencer seeks to discover what is common in the
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XdjiLro'icf anneXaixs nol a’nXwiBii .boriXsnj
-nocno babnollB bna enuXan 'to nciXqaoirco won ^ieni.Tao hb Irioviol
.’^dqosoXldq •'lo noiXnXo'TqiaXnl ciXsilB‘tiiX en a nol xSI^lS
r1 *,4doosoIirirr , (.r.0qi*0n8X ) *i9cneq3 X'lod'i^H ol gnibnvOOoA
do r>,evoop.lb erlX to sXaianoo 8X1” .9£baI\Ycn:?<
-son ojXniofilnfT naXi.c iXiBC oriX Ooldv nobno aelnlonx'icr Isnensg
siff,.t Xidi ,b3:siir&-g’^o ecf n.fic secfioics iBironr adX y.d '^’vfFliri
-©.b j"T:oInn © «rix ycT beniwid'o od 'leiiXier '^©0 ynB-tirru
do noiXBlXcc fjxbsqoXrYorfe elcrmXs edx yJ non bod.tefir evrXonb
odX ni nofnfsoo si X«r>' 'lavcosib oX neorTon3 ...eXcb*!
©vl XatBanror s/iX *10 enssm yd awai bn© seXqionXnq iaicone
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method." «•
"Spencer’s theory of knowledge shows the influence of
both John Stuart Mill and Sir William Hamilton. He chal-
lenged pure empiricism on the ground of the fact that per-
ceptions require elaboration before knowledge can arise end
this elaboration nresupposes both a faculty and a standard.
The ultimate basis of all knowledge consists of the faculty
of distinguishing the like from the unlike; even radical
scepticism must presuppose this basal princinle. The ulti-
mate standards by which truth and error are distinguished
consist of the principle that a proposition which is inherent-
ly self-contradictory cannot be true. Truth implies a per-
fect agreement between our ideas (representation of things)
and our impressions (presentation of things). Every infer-
ence and every postulate assumes the truth of the criterion
contained in the principle of contradiction. This criterion
cannot therefore be derived from mere experience: it is a
priori . Every individual must possess the innate faculty
of comparing impressions and drawing inferences from impress-
ions, but this faculty cannot be derived from the impressions
alone. But the a priori appertains to the individual alone.
If we inquire into the origin of this faculty we miUSt anneal
to the race from which the individual has sprung. Empiricism
is in error only in so far as the particular individual is
concerned, not as respects the whole race. The experiences.
* ("orief History." Httffding. p. S51)
"nistory of Philosophy." Hoffding. Vol. II. pp. 458-467)
ii
lo eorfaullni erii eworia aj^vaX’.von\ lo sWaonaqo**
~X.Gf5o sH mGilXXW liS ona IXiM :fistrX 8 ft.icii ritod
-'lerr iGffi Jos'! ad.t lo bnuo'xg odi nro msxo xiigaia b9 ,*3,nsl
baa 8 BrT:s aao 93 b9 lwo(T?I aic'tad rtoi^s'todaXa ^‘iiupeT: e.n.olJqeo
.friabnats a bno j X uc a'Y .3 d.tocf 3930Trri'39'irT rroiJ’.a'iodels 3 Xrl.t
Y.XIifCR'l a.iX qo 3.t3icr30c a^balworr^f IXs lo sl^ed aiarirXilu adT
lani-bs-T nsve ;&AiInu e Ll mo'rJ 0 >fiX adi ^nnldalir^gni tp/
b
~i,?XiJ erlT . sIf'rxo'TX'icr Xsaad airf.t eac'^crLfe-ei'T j-syor '^isioi^cT^og
S>0 r(siy3rrr.t 8 X& stg 'iotis bn& diu-xX loidw y,d sbiabnaja
-Xnersdni. al rlolriv rroXXiaooroxg s .tedX eXqicxixq sn'X lo Xaisnoo
-X9CT B sollqml dXyxT .suxt ed xonnac *'4 ioctrxbB'fX.xoo-liaa yX
(s^xin.t '>.0 rroiiaixasoxaoT ) seaoi tuo xaa'.vjsd inoioae-i^jB ioe'i
- yis/S
. ( Bgrrxni Jo noivf aXnasa iq) saoias-axqini -'suo baa
ncXiaoJ'Xxo ori.t lo r'Xu-iX 9d.t 3001^333 aiaXutsoq yiava yffa aona
rtoixatixo sIciT ,aoi^^ib.:vxXffoe 'to olgXonXxq ed^ ni boniatnoo
B 3x XX t aonai'ieoxe o'leis no'xJ bavi'-iab 9d aio'to'iedX ionnso
\J[tjr..sJ oJisrmi ofii asoosofr Xay.n laubi/lbni
.
X’toi'iq
-380'Tcr'TT/. o'O'xJ aeoro'ieJ.ol ^rfxt'/aib brfa anoXssa'iofnl jnX'tgqmoo "Xo
3rfoi3S0"f(TrnX 9ri..f n'oi't bavi-T-gb od y.tCx'oad eidX iud ,2.aoX
enola Jaubivibni edx o.t grrlBiTe^^cra xTO.r-ro' g 3rfX Xnd .anola
Xaer^'ra tgufj sv; yXIxfoa*! 3xdX lo ni^i'xo odf oini aiiupnx ot 'tl
maXaitbaorH .^oyroa aad la.cbivibni 5dX dcXdw itioil ©oa*! sri? 0 :^
3i iBubivibnl -xaly ciXTas adX aa 'ts't oa ni yino lome nx ax
, 3acrc9XT0rrx9 sdT .aoBX aXoil?' edX aXosqaan ea Xon ^oan'iecnoo
(ids .q .^nibTldli ’'.y'loiaXn 'tax'Xa”) a
{'^^i-aet^.rrrr .II .XoV .sniblloH " . •^dgoaoXiriX lo iio^Jaxn”
acquired by the race during the course of countless genera-
tions, the incessantly recurring influence to which it was
subjected, evolve dispositions which form the basis unon
which single individuals begin their course of develonraent.
That is to say, the single individual possesses in his native
organization the clear profit of the experiences of untold
generations. — He thereby extends the scope of the older ern-
piricism by going back of the individuals to the race.” »
Hence it follows that for Spencer the actual realm of
knowledge is marked out by the fundamental function of thought
which consists in the distinguishing the like from the unlike.
Ihings which can be compared and related to other things can to
that degree be known. The relativity of thought is in this
system a necessary conclusion and such relativity applies of
course to ultimate conceptions. Since the Absolute is uncon-
ditioned it cannot be related to anything else and therefore is
unknowable. Yet even this Unknowable must be, after the analogy
of our own energy, something positive, a sort of Universal Energy
which underlies all objectivity and determines subjective changes
and therefore gives form and content to our knowledge.
The Spencerian system as well as the Positivist school in
general, furnishes the raison d*etre for the work of real con-
structive thinking on the part of Bowne. In order to under-
stand the full implications of Bowne *s system we need to see the
("Brief History". Kfiffding. 253)
("History of Philosophy". Hoffding. Vol. II. 0^.467-477)
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to BoiXofTR Y*x‘/xi3X©'i »10 JJ8 b/SB AoiauXonoo 'i'lBSBSOSfn b
-AOOOL' Si BlulosdA ©n't ©onxa , anoxiosortoo s.t.siniiXi! oi os-iuoo
3 i ©'loto'xsd.l bn« ©ais jr^nldi’^ris oi hsieloA ocf iortrtso il benoiiib
YpoXanB orM 'letta ,©cf .isitnT 9ldr?wor>fnU slrU oeva ,teY .oId‘5'*-orf^r:To
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• ’lebnu o.t Aobio nl .oowod to Jasq; oiiX ao 3AiAAxiii ©vitctiiJa
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)
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T5urT>ose for whioh he writes. He is e conscious defender of
certain nhilosophical concentions by which he seeks to make
secure the foundations of religion. We have to do here with
no merely disinterested thinker. Bowne taught at a time when
meterialistic thought and the old associational psychology and
the new doctrine of evolution were united in drastic effort to
undermine faith in the divine and to substitute for it the
seemingly more real, yet in reality more attenuated doctrine
of Naturalism. His work is therefore to be judged in its re-
sults as much as in its presuppositions and actual contents.
His was the chosen task of revealing the falsity of Naturalism
and Agnosticism by making evident, not the falsity of science,
but its false assumptions. Hence, we do not find in Bowne so
much a system of doctrine, as we do a system of critical judg-
ment on current Naturalism and the nsychology of Association-
ism. The great work of Bcwne along the lines of nositive re-
ligious construction will doubtless be considered his chief con-
tribution to the thought of his day.
Bowne succeeds in delimiting the spheres of science and
philosophy, giving to the one the function of observing, classi-
fying and arranging facts, to the other the duty of interpreta-
tion. Moreover, on the positive side, he adds the fruitful
truths of Personalism to the Kantian theory of knowledge and to
the doctrine of evolution. He seeks to solve the problems of
Naturalism on the basis of epistemology. To quote his own
\
words :-
'io 'Tet're'teb FUfolcRnco s r-it gH .29.ti^>w 9(1 dclfi^ T0*> eaO^'TUCT
I
9 >iBir. o1 s?f9©8 orf rfrxrfvr aroio^oc'Too I Boirfcosolidn nis^f'ies
fiiTiw ©'Ted cb od evad sW .^o.tgiXeT '>0 snoiiBbrjx'o*^ ©ri.t ©'kj^gs
rre.i^ ©/niX a fs enroa .-xciJ^nlrlX baXse^e.-trjiaxb ^^iG'xon! on
bn 8 YgOjO-dr^sd J anoi^axcoaaa bXo yn^ bns cxdoiiBiisdGiD
oi drto't'l:© ©iX3ST:b fii boXxn.u ©tsw noiXxfXov© lo &nx'iJooi> wen efiX
erit XX no't 9ixrXXXad^?a oX bns enxvXD eriX nx ridiB‘1 enxim:ei>ni-'
aniiXcob beXcuaetXB otoro xJHbot: n.x X J'i txaen eiom
-ei 3d i ni begoLt sG'i j'i&neiiX 3i aiow sxH .inaxisiiiXsi^ lo
.aXneXnoo Xsuxoa bna anoXX iacnaifsoiq ail nX 33 dou{p 3« aXXua
msil6'tt/Xa>I *Xo xilais'X edX ’.niXaeve-i lo jIe:b) nosodo edX caw aXK
,er;neioa lo exit ^o»n .Xnebive gnlTfem 'id {naXciiaonsA bn
3
03 o.rr”7o9 ni bnil Ion ob ©k .oonaH . snoi trr.'TTxraa© ©sIbI eXi J-ud
iBoiXXnr lo reiSYE 3 ob sb ^enintoob lo fnadaYa « rlouni
-PoiXsirossA lo y^ioXodoY^'^ 9dX bna nisi fnen'wc no
-OT eviXiaon Ic sertil edX gnolR enwoS lo Ano'^ Isonr^ odT .TreX
-rfor leido aid benebXanoo od fcCsXXcfuot IXi^ noxXrxj’iXanoo cool^tS
.YBb aid lo Xd^jiiodX edX oX noXXLJdx'U
bn& eoneics lo aenexlga edX gnjiiaxiob ni. ebeesoua onwoa
-x33bXo ^^xOivieado lo noixcnol edX eno edX ox ^inxvijj ,Ydqoaoxx.clq
-flXentrnoXnl lo iXub oiXX nedXo edX oX ,ajoel ^.nxi^na'ine ona ^xu'il
XulXiifnl 9dX abX^B sd .ebxs evxXXaoq edX no t‘i9vo6io4 .xioxX
oX bns egbeX'flonx' Ic YiosdX rmiXnaA erix oX nisilanoaie'l lo anXiinX
lo snrsldonrr adt avXoa oX s:Aeea eil .noiXuXove lo emnXoob edX
nwo aid eXoop oT
.




"intellectual campaign commonly decided at points
quite remote from the apparent battlefield, and without any
' thunder of the captains and the shoutings * • These are the
strategic points that command the field and decide the day.
They lie in our epistemology and metaphysics - subjects which
have little or no practical bearing, yet out of them are the
issues of intellectual life or death. Our notions of knowledge
and its nature, our conception of reality and casuality, our
thoughts respecting space and time, —the two great intimidat-
ing Phantoms, —these are the things that decide our general
way of thinking and give direction to our thoughts even in
morals and religion." w
Bergson bases his entire system of philosophy, with all
its practical deductions, upon a new theory of the knowing pro-
cess. In the ordinary meaning, science is a knowledge by analy-
sis of the actual facts of life and of the universe. At best,
according to isergson all we can do in this realm is to tabulate
and draw deductions that may serve as general truths universally
applicable so far as we know. However, in our search after
these positive facts we are limited by the inherently symbolic
nature of thought. As soon as a process of any sort has been
observed and a concept of that process formulated Bergson finds
we have left the dynamic and retreated into the purely static;
we have lost contact with life and our knowledge is only rela-
tive. Bergson would call attention to the truth that in
* ("Personalism". Bowne. Introduction VIII
.
)
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15
addition to the concept and the law and also to the apparent
facts of life as treated by the sciences, there is life itself,
for which no purely intellectual concept will suffice, and for
which no law can be construed in terms that are purely logical.
In addition to the symbolic word and the symbolic fact is the
reality that must be understood, not alone by mere intellect,
but by the new, or rather the newly emnhasized, nrocess of in-
tuition . In some way we must gain a knowledge deener than the
truths for which the formulas of thought and the facts of
science stand and thereby attain an actual experience of reality.
Possibly this deeper knowledge can be attained by refusing to be
bound by the symbolic and by placing due emphasis upon life
which reveals its nature in other realms than in pure thought,
oergson asks:-
”Must we give up fathoming the depth of life? Must
we keep to that mechanistic idea of it which the understanding
will always give us an idea necessarily artificial and sym-
bolical, since it makes the total activity of life shrink to the
form of a certain human activity which is only a partial and
local manifestation of life, a result or by-nroduct of the vital
process? We should have to do so, indeed, if life had emnloyed
all the psychical potentiality it possesses in producing pure
understanding that is to say, in making geometricians. But
the line of evolution that ends in man is not the only one. On
other paths, diverging from it, other forms of consciousness have
been developed, which have not been able to free themselves from
IJGQonoc :^acT o.^ no.iiDO«
,‘^Xos^^ e*^iX si .^eonDic-a ariJ \ci
DeSao'iS a« slii lo a^os’t
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sxoa'i 9d? bn« Xd£L'OfiX Ic B^Xi.-rno'^ orif rfcinw lol afiXniX
.yXXXffei 'Xc ernvl'iQr^xe £&vfc& ns nisXXrt ^'XaneftX bfJfi fonaXs ecneioa
9cr oX ^nlain&-i ^^c^ benlfiXXs ed nso egb^^^’^’on:i leaoafo axfiX yidisso^
e'^xX nonu aiaarlcme ai,b gnioslq y,X bnis ciloJm'ta adi bn*»ou
,!fd^^uoiU Qiun nx nsnX amXsQi lariXo ni ©i.^Jaa aXx r.oiiiw
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external constraint or to regain control over themselves, as
the human intellect has done, but which, none the less, also
express what is immanent and essential in the evolutionary
movement* Suppose these other forms of consciousness brought
together and amalgamated with intellect. Would not the re-
sult be a consciousness as wide as life? And such conscious-
ness, turning around suddenly against the push of life which it
feels behind, would have a vision of life complete — would it
not? — even though the vision were fleeting.
"it will be said that, even so, we do not transcend our
intellect, for it is still with our intellect, and through our
intellect, that we see the other forms of consciousness. And
this would be right if we were pure intellect, if there did not
remain, around our conceptual and logical thought a vague
nebulosity, made of the very substance out of which has been
formed the luminous nucleus that we call the intellect. There-
in reside certain powers that are comnlimentary to the under-
standing, powers of which we have only an indistinct feeling
when we remain shut up in ourselves, but which will become clear
and distinct when they perceive themselves at work, so to speak,
in the evolution of nature. They will thus learn what sort of
effort they must make to be intensified and expanded in the very
direction of life.
"This amounts to saying that theory of knowledge and theory
of life seem to us inseparable. A theory of life that is not
accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as
they stand, the concepts which the understanding puts at its
,8evX©am9iii 'xevc lo'tSnoo ci io cfnijs-rtanoo
oelfi ,8S9f erfi enon ^rioirir iocf .snob a^rf ioeILo.+r»i 9rl.t
>C'i9nciiiiIv>ve edi ni lAtine'p'r'.e bf’« ai Rrfw aeo'rrxe
i/fgito'icf fcRsrtsuoirsnoo '!o 'xerfXo eBBiiS f^.^ootyuc .JnetBevofn
-9*1 9/1^ .ton MuoW , JT9lX9,tJti dtiT? foe jRaTB^XBraiK fcas 'lorltsgot
-aifoicanoG rfojjg bnA Vo'tiX zr ebiw zb ;-.sor‘ 80oioanoo s ocf tXua
ti rioi.iw e'tll 'to r{?.oq oiii J'Baia^s ’^inabfcua bnooTs ;^itin'iud[ <8sen
.11 bluow -- ^teXcirtOo elii lo noiaiv b ovari biuow ,i>nxftfid aXeo'l
.goiteel'i 9TC0W noislv adt ii^^vorit ~~ ?don
•too JbnDf'snB'xt' ten ob aw ,08 rteva .tarit blB'd sd iXiw tl"
too ff>,uotilt bn ,9 ^XroXIotni too ritiw iiivts 3x ti to‘t ttooXiaXni
bnA seenp.L-oioanoo lo scfttolf 'lonio 9d.t ses aw Xant ^ .tooXXetni;
ton bib eiofit 'ti tGelXo.tnl otoq otew ew ‘il tiljUt ad bioow slrft
9,u|43V .€ trs3iLfcdt IboXsoX bns XBotosonoo too bnootB <nXBnT3t
neod 3 b;1 rfcirlw *to too oorcBtodos ytav an't Ttc sbarj ,Ytl8oXudsn
-atsrIT .tosXIatrfI odt XXeo or taiit esjotvun aoorrimrfX arft b&.'inol
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disposal: It can but enclose the facts, willing or not, in
preexisting frames which it regards as ultimate. It thus ob-
tains a symbolism which is convenient, perhaps even necessary
to positive science, but not a direct vision of its object.
On the other hand, a theory of knowledge which does not re-
place the intellect in the general evolution of life would
teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been con-
structed nor how we can enlarge or go beyond them. It is
necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and
theory of life, should join each other, and, by a circular
process, push each other on unceasingly.** ^
Bergson aims, not to minimize intellect, but to bring to
its assistance another factor which in the process of evolu-
tion has been sidetracked. The acquisitive power of instinct
in the animal world is unquestioned while the axiomatic charac-
ter of the intuitions in human beings constitute a factor not
to be neglected. Science should not merely cut up reality in-
to little sections and study reality in these detached parts; -
Science should gather up again into the whole and study reality
in relation to the generation and growth of the universe. The
intellect and the intuitions join hands in observing (** vitally **
not logically alone,) the underlying reality. Thus with Berg-
son does knowledge cease to be relative and become absolute.
As Hijffding says, after having demonstrated the nractical
nature of thought;- **We shall find that under three different
(** Creative Evolution". Bergson, pp. XII, XIV)
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forms there is always an irrational remainder, viz., in the
relation of quality to quantity, in the significance which the
time-relation has for the casual concept and in the relation
between subject and object.” * It is precisely this ”irra-
tional remainder” which discloses the province for the intui-
tions as explained by Bergson. Instead of simply noting its
presence in human life and passing it by as something to be
tolerated but not fully explained, Bergson gives a place to
intuition along with pure ratiocination in the process of
knowledge.
Bowne, in answering the question, ”How is exoerience possi-
ble?” writes as follows;- ”Kant*s answer is well known. Ex-
perience is not something given ready made from without, but
is actively constructed by the mind within. Experience is
possible only through a certain constitutive mental activity,
according to principles immanent in the understanding. In this
way the raw material of sense impressions, which in themselves
are fleeting and discontinuous, is built into a rational world
of experience. This insight was Kant’s great contribution to
philosonhy, and it remains, in spite of all criticism a per-
manent Possession of reflective thought.”
”This result finally vacates the traditional empiricism
which views the mind as only passively receptive in knowledge.
.... The principles of knowing are primarily immanent laws
w (”Problems of Philosophy”. Hoffding. p.85)
itVf ( ”Personalism” . Bowne. pp. 55,56)
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of mental activity." »
"Knowledge, of course, cannot be defined except in terms
of itself, neither can it be deduced from that which is not
knowledge. There must always be a certain unique and imme-
diate character to knowledge which can rest on nothing but
itself. In some sense, then, there is no answer to the
question, how is knowledge possible, for there is nothing
deeper or other than knowledge by which to explain it."
"Knowing as an act never ends in itself as a psychologi-
cal fact. It always relates itself to a content which the
knowing act does not make but reproduces. There is, then,
in the very idea of our knowing a presupposition of something
existing apart from the knowing as a mental event, and this,
indeed, is the very essence of the idea."
"Knowledge is conditioned both by the nature of the sub-
ject and by the nature of the object. In order that a thing
may be known, the subject must act in certain ways and the ob-
ject must be of a certain nature. If the subject remained
passive and inert, there would be no knowledge; and if the
object were such as to admit of no rational construction again
there could be no knowledge." .... 'in all inter-
action between things the reaction is but an expression of the
agent’s own nature, for the manifestation of which other things
but furnish the occasion. Hence, the mental reaction which we
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call knowledge can be looked upon only as an expression of our
mental nature according to principles immanent in itself.” %
”The existence of things is by no means the seme as our
knowledge of them, and reflection makes plain that if things
existed precisely as they appear to us the knowledge of them
could arise only as the mind by its own action reproduces the
contents of things for thought. Knowledge is nothing which
can be imported ready made into a passive mind, but the mind
must actively construct knowledge for itself.... The things
do not pass reedy made into the mind. Indeed they do not
pass into the mind at all, but upon occasion of certain action
upon the mind the mind unfolds within itself the vision and
knowledge of the world.”
”That which is in sense is very different from that which
is in thought. The sense world is flitting, fleeting, dis-
continuous. Epistemology shows that it is all en inarticu-
late, phatasmagoric flux or dissolving view until thought
brings into it its rational principles and fixes and inter-
prets it. The sense world, so far as it is articulate, is
already e thought world. Its permanences and identities are
products of thought. The complex system.s of relations whereby
it is defined and articulated is a thought product which cen in
no way be given to sense. The far-reaching inferences of
science whereby our spontaneous thought of the world is pro-
foundly transformed, are something which exists for neither
w (’’Personalism”. Bowne. p.63) (Ibid p.64)
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eye nor ear, but for thought only. The world of science dif-
fers from the world of sense as widely as the conceptions of
the astronomer differ from the algebraic signs by which he ex-
presses them.” « “Thus it is manifest that without this
synthetic and interpretative action of the mind there could be
no world whatever for us. ... It must be said that no one
can ever perceive any wor).d but the one he makes.”
”But it is manifest that the nature of the object is also
a determining factor. . . . For unless the objects themselves
were harmonious with these laws and form.s, the latter could
not be imposed upon them.”
In criticising Kant, Bowne says: ”To this result (the
nothingness of things-in-themselves ) any doctrine which denies
the application of the categories of thought to reality must
certainly come. The thing in itself, or things in themselves,
roust be brought within the range of thought or must go out of
existence.” ^hhs-%
”A truly extra-mental existence, in the sense of something
beyond thought and independent of it and in no way amenable to
it, is an impossible concention. If we assume that the world
of things originated in thought and expressed thought they
would be homogeneous with thought, end there would be no a
priori reason why we should not know them. This theistic
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and assimilates the problem of knowledge to that of mutual un-
derstanding among persons.” % Bowne asserts that this theis-
tic suggestion Kant nowhere recognized in his epistemology.
’’The categories in themselves are simply forms of mental
arrangement and merely prescribe the form in which experience
is to be ordered when it is given. In this respect they are
like the rules of grammar.” iiVrii
”From a theistic standpoint the universe itself is no
proper static existence, but only the divine thought finding
the realization through the divine will, and that thought for
us must find expression in the order of our experience. But
it is quite credible that our present experience does not ex-
haust the contents of that thought and so does not exhaust the
possibilities of experience.”
”In this sense there may be any number of universes of ex-
perience, each of which is relative to its own subjects, and
all of which are embraced in the thought or plan of the In-
finite Mind and Will on which they all depend.
’’Thus we dispense with the extra-mental universe of unre-
flecting thought. That view arises from confounding extra-
human with extra-mental. . . this world can never be explained
on an impersonal plane. The world of experience exists for
us only as a rational spiritual principle by which we repro-
duce it for our thought, and it has its existence apart from
^ ( ”Personalism” . Bowne. p.92) (Ibid p.lOO)
(Ibid, p.93) (Ibid p.108)
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US only through a rational spiritual principle on which it
depends, and the rational nature which it expresses.” ^
Bergson makes, as we have noted above, a new approach to
the same problem* He adds to rationalism the instrument of
the intuitions. ”As an examination of the possibility of the
mathematical sciences led in Kant to a critique of the under-
standing, the examination of the possibility of the biological
sciences leads in Bergson to a critique of intuition.”
”His doctrine of the intuitions is an attempt to rebuild the
bridge between science and metaphysics.”
k
From a study of philosophic methods Bergson concludes that
there are two different ways of knowing a thing. ”The first
implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter
into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we
are pieced and on the symbols by which we express ourselves.
The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on
any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop
at the relative ! the second, in those cases where it is possi-
ble, to attain the absolute . ” This first kind of knowl-
edge is a study of movement from without, the second is a par-
ticipation in that m.ovement. The first is the mere reading of




("The Philosophy of Bergson.” Lindsey, p. 17)
( Ibid p. 19)
(’’Introduction to Metaphysics.” Bergson, p. 1)
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imagination, actually entering into the experiences of the
characters and thereby realizing an absolute knowledge of
them. "Description, history, and analysis leave me here in
the relative. Coincidence with the person himself would
alone give the absolute." ^
"It follows that an absolute could only be given in an
intuition , whilst everything else falls within the province
of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual
sympathy by which one pieces oneself within an object in or-
der to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently in-
expressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation ^
which reduces the objects to elements already known, that is
to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze,
therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something
other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a
development into symbols, a representation taken from success-
ive points of view from which we may note as many resemblances
as possible between the new object which we are studying and
others which we believe we know already.... But intuition, if
intuition is possible, is a simple act." in:*
"... The ordinary function of positive science is analy-
sis. . . Metaphysics is the science which claims to dispense
with symbols."
Bergson affirms that there is at least one reality which
« ("Introduction to Metaphysics." pp. 4,5)
( Ibid P.8) (Ibid p.9)
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we seize from within: This is our own personality in its flow-
ing through time, ourselves which endure. He says we may sym-
pathize intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sym-
pathize with our own selves.’*
**There is, beneath these sharply cut crystals and this
frozen surface (perceptions, memories, tendencies and motor
habits) a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux
I have ever seen. There is a succession of states, each of
which announces that which follows and contains that which pre-
cedes, it.** **
**This inner life may be compared to the unrolling of a
coil, for there is no living being who does not see himself
coming gradually to the end of his role and to live is to grow
old. But it may just as well be compared to a continual roll-
ing up, like that of a thread on a ball, for our past follows
us, it swells incessantly with the present that it picks up on
its way; and consciousness means memory.'*
"The inner life is all this at once; variety of qualities,
continuity of progress, and unity of direction. It cannot be
represented by images." "It is true that no image can
reproduce exactly the original feeling I have of the flow of
my own conscious life."
"If a man is incapable of getting for himself the intuition





-woll 3^1 y,.t i:I.3 rxo 3 'T 9 C^ nwo 'liJC ei siftT :fiirliiw esxss ew
-•nT'^3 3%B3 gH .GTiibno rioiii?^ sg'/^ o^iuo <,811111 ri^uO'Xiil sni
-mv;3 '{Ini,sn 3G 9?r lucf ,,03le j^nirilon rilivp i^IIstilosIXalni $siiilsq
’’.eavlaa nv?o tuo riliw GsiiX.taq
sXfil &n.8 luo -.^Xq'isda Gaarll dlasned <2i GrtodI*’
ioloi!T bd3 aeiofTGbnel ,391*10318111 ,3doi Jqao*xeq) soaloua hgso'iI
XI/n \n.R o.t aIa'?«*i8qnioo Ion k1 rioiriw xuXt auouniSnoo a (asidaii
qo do«9 , 39l 3 l 3 *^0 dox33GOG02 3 sx snsflT .daea X9V9 -overf i
-0'j<‘'' rfoXriw tsfll gftxBidoc bns 3’’'ioXIoT' riolrfi^ ladl aaontiodns rfoiri'w
iHt ”.li. aabeo
9 lo sdiXXoddLf Grfl ol bGicqaioc acf ^^.sm ©ill *i©nni aXifT”
qioaxTiri ion aaob od^ gdlsd ^nivil orr si an©i1t ool ,IioG
^o'TT^. dl 3 i evil of bn© eXon aid Ito bne ©dl ol gnimoo
-IXon Xauailnoo s ol birraomoo ocf IIsw as la^C li lu8 .5Io
owoIXol laBd XGO -lol ,Il3cf 8 no basniU a lo ladl 9>(iX gnl
no du 3>IoXn ti fariS Inoaenq 9dl dliw %lSnBS3eocil allowa 11 .. ei/
”.^
4no^T^era ansara aaeneuoiosnoo bns ;^3ir all
,
3 Gilxl 3sxp lo lilelnsv jeono 18 alrit XIs ai ©liX xennl ©riT**
ed lonnso II .nolloanlb *^0 ^lim/ bn© .aasnsonq 'lo \^llunilnoo
nso ogsrai on Isdl snnl ax 11” '‘.3©g8flii bGinaaanqan
Oo wol*! 9dl lo ©vBd I gniX©©^ Isnlgiio ©dl '{lloaxa 0ouboxq©n
aiioioanor nwo ’lim
nollli/lnl Gfil qi93 oilrf nol anilleg lo GXcfsqsonl al nsin e 'll”
(q,q ” .oolay^dosleM ol noiloubonlnl”
)
(ir.q bid I ) ««
(cii.cr bid I )
(<f-I.cT bicfl)
(21-0 bivJIl
of constitutive duration of his own being, nothing will ever
give it to him, concept no more than images. Here the single
aim of the philosopher should be to promote a certain effort,
which in most men is usually fettered by habits of mind more
useful to life.” ^
”Just in so far as abstract ideas can render service to
analysis, that is, to the scientific study of the object in
its relation to other objects, so far are they incapable of
replacing intuition, that is, the metaphysical investigation y
of what is essential and unique in the object. • And, on the
other hand, beside the illusion there is also a very serious
danger. For the concept generalizes at the same time as it
abstracts. The concept can only symbolize a particular pro-
perty by making it common to an infinity of things. It there-
fore always more or less deforms the property by the extension
it gives to it.”
”Either metaphysics is only this play of ideas, or else,
if it is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science
and not simply an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order
to reach intuition. Certainly, concents are necessary to it,
for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and
metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences. But it
is only truly itself when it goes beyond the concept, or at
least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts
» (’’Introduction to Metaphysics.” pp. 15-16)
( Ibid pp. 18-19)
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in order to create a kind very different from those which we
habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid repre-
sentations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting
forms of intuition.” . . .”Let it suffice us for the moment
to have shown that our duration can be presented to us direct-
ly in an intuition, and that it can be suggested to us indi-
rectly by images, but that it can never -- if we confine the
word concept to its proper meaning — be enclosed in a con-
ceptual representation.”
The multiplicity of our own duration bears no resemblance
to any other multiplicity we know. ” However much I manipu-
late the two concents of unity and multiplicity, portion them
out, combine them differently, practice on them the most subtle
operation of mental chemistry, I never attain anything which re-
sembles the simple intuition which I have of duration; while,
on the contrary, when I replace myself in duration by an effort
of intuition, I immediately perceive how it is unity, multipli-
city, end many other things beside.”
”We do penetrate into it (duration), however, and that can
only be by an effort of intuition. In this sense, an inner,
absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self is
possible.”
Bergson proceeds to develop the thought that it is as im-
possible to gain a complete conceptual view of the self as it
("Introduction to Metaphysics”. p.21) (Ibid -on.SP-SS)
( Ibid pp.21-22) (Ibid p.24)
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is to gain a complete photographic representation of a city.
Taken from no matter how many different angles, the photo-
graph nevertheless reveals, only in part, the complete con-
cent of the city. There is no way of reconstituting a thing
by operations practised on symbolic elements alone. But,-
”Such, is, however, the undertaking of the philosophers
who try to reconstruct personality with psychical states,
whether they confine themselves to those states alone, or
whether they add a kind of thread for the purpose of joining
the states together. Both empiricists and rationalists are
victims of the same fallacy. Both of them mistake nartial
notations for real parts , thus confusing the point of view of
analysis and of intuition, of science and of metaphysics.” *
Bergson makes evident in the following passage the mis-
take of all empiricists like Taine and Stuart Mill. ”Psychol
ogists in the method they apply, they have remained meta-
physicians in the object they set before themselves. They
desire an intuition in analysis, which is the very negation
of it. They look for the ego, they claim to find it in
psychical states, though this diversity of states has itself
only been obtained, and could only be obtained, by transport-
ing oneself outside the ego altogether, so as to make a series
of sketches, notes and more or less symbolic and schematic dia
grams. Thus, however much they place the states side by side
multiplying points of contact and exploring the intervals, the
« ("Introduction to Metaphysics." Bergson, pp. P9-30)
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ego always escapes them, so that they finish by seeing in it
nothing but a vain phantom. We might as well deny that the
” Iliad** had any meaning, on the ground that we had looked in
vain for that meaning in the interval between the letters of
which it is composed. Philosophical empiricism is born here,
then, of a confusion between the point of view of intuition
and that of analysis.** »
Bergson then maintains that rationalism is a dupe of the
same illusion. **Like empiricism, it considers the psychical
states as so many fragments detached from an ego that binds
them together. Like empiricism, it tries to join these frag-
ments together in order to recreate the unity of self. Like
empiricism finally, it sees this unity of the self in the con-
tinually renewed effort it makes to clasp it, steal away in-
definitely like a phantom. • .Pationalism persists in affirm-
ing the unity of the person.'* %%
"Philosophy does not consist in the choice of certain con-
cepts, and in taking sides with a school, but in the search for
a unique intuition from which we can descend with equal ease to
different concepts, because we are placed above the divisions
of the schools." Philosophy will know exactly what unity,
what multiplicity, and what reality superior both to abstract
unity and multiplicity the multiple unity of the self actually
is, "only when it recovers possession of the simple intuition
» ("Introduction to Metaphysics." np.31,3P)
( Ibid p.33) (Ibid n.38)
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of. the self by the self... In order to accomplish this (intui-
tion) it is necessary to proceed by a reversal of the usual
work of the intellect. Thinking usually consists in nassing
from concepts to things, and not from things to concepts. . .
Either there is no philosophy possible, and all knowledge of
things is a practical knowledge aimed at the profit to be
drawn from them, or else philosophy consists in placing one-
self within the object itself by an effort of intuition.” ^
Bergson asks us to note that concepts always remain sta-
tionary. ”But there is no state of mind, however simole,
which does not change every moment, since there is no con-
sciousness without memory, and no continuation of a state with-
out the addition, to the oresent feeling, of the memory of past
moments. It is this which constitutes duration. . . Without
this survival of the past into the present there would be no
duration, but only instantaneity.
”
”This means that analysis operated always on the immobile,
while intuition always places itself in mobility, or, what
comes to the same thing, in duration.”
”.
. .From intuition one can oass to analysis, but not
from analysis to intuition.” Therefore we can under-
stand motion, not from study of external positions of the mov-
ing object, but only by an act of intuition, placing ourselves
within the moving object and experiencing motion. Only so can
i’f ( ”Introduction to Metaphysics”, pp. 38-43)
( Ibid p.45) (Ibid p.47) (Ibid p.48)
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we reach an absolute knowledge of motion.
In brief Bergson's " Intuition ” is to be understood as fol-
lows. There is a reality which is external and yet is given
immediately to the mind. One understands this to mean more
''than Bowne means by experience of reality. There is in Berg-
son no hint of an Infinite Agency outside the human which
parallels our perception with reality^ Bergson means actual
participation in reality. The mark of reality is mobility;
there is everywhere an incipient change of direction. "In
interpreting reality our mind, following its natural bent,
proceeds on the one hand by solid perception end on the other
by stable conceptions." » Intellect tends to become rigid in




static quality of concepts makes possible the various anti-^
monies of thought.
The truth Bergson brings out is that our thought can, if
it will exercise a natural power, place itself within reality.
This constitutes a reversal of the ordinary processes of
thought, or rather a thinking back to the living mobility.
This reversal means that we shall have to revitalize our con-
cepts by adding to them a new content which will escape becom-
ing static and will feel the changing fact as well as form a
concept of it.
This reasoning sounds, as it doubtless is, somewhat mysti-
cal and exceedingly indefinite. But Bergson points out that
("Introduction to Metaphysics." p.66)
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we have all experienced this intuition in the moment of liter-
ary or oratorical composition. Without apparent effort, the
mind, after it has long dwelt on a certain subject, suddenly
feels and under the burst of feeling resolves the mass of ap-
parently inchoate facts into an orderly whole. This act of
feeling is not a mere stringing together of items, it is vital
assembling into a genuine production. Bergson might have gone
on to speak in the same way with reference to art in general.
There is much in art that comes, not with great regard to act-
ual intellectual conception or even of reason in the sense of
conscious effort. The inspiration of the artist is as apt to
be feeling as intellect. Bergson would have us acquaint our-
selves with this vital impulse, and thus utilize the unconscious,
yet vital, powers that make for genius. Bergson’s reasoning,
however, goes somewhat deeper than his illustration.
”Metaphysical intuition seems to be something of the same
kind. What corresponds here to the documents and notes of
literary composition is the sum of observations and experience
gathered together by positive science. For we do not obtain
any intuition from reality — that is, an intellectual sympathy
with the most intimate part of it — unless we have won its con-
fidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations.
And it is not merely a question of assimilating the most con-
spicuous facts} so immense a mass of facts must be accumulated
and fused together, that in this fusion all the preconceived and
premature ideas which observers may unwittingly have put into
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their observations will be certain to neutralize each other. In
this way only can the bare materiality of the known facts be ex-
posed to view. Even in the simple and privileged case which we
have used as an example, even for the direct contact of the self
with the self, the final effort of distinct intuition would be
impossible to any one who had not combined and compared with
each other a very large number of analyses. . • .In this sense
metaphysics has nothing in common with a generalization of facts,
and nevertheless it might be defined as integral experience .” *
Bowne’s nearest approach made to a use of this theory of
intuition is to be found in his "Personalism”, where such theory
is indicated but not clearly announced. We can see in Bowne’s
demand for knowledge as based on life something comparable to
Bergson’s "Intuitionalism”. He says: "The debates between the
empirical and the a priori schools have been carried on in the
assumption that the validity of knowledge absolutely depended up-
on it. This is only partly true. There are two questions at
issue between these two schools, — the form and the validity of
knowledge; and these two are to some extent indenendent
. The /
empiricist seeks to explain the suggested form of knowledge by
the association of sensation, and here his failure is complete.
The rationalist rightly points out that the form of experience,
even as mental facts and without any reference to its validity,
cannot be exnlained in this way.” But both Hum.e and Kant
* ("Introduction to Metaphysics". np.PO-PP)
("Personalism". Bowne. pn. 306-307)
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admit that we cannot practically rest in the result of relativi-
ty but mus.t fall back on faith in the practical needs and in-
terests of life.
”We are greatly helped in this matter by the growing in- ~1
sight into the practical nature of belief. One of the super-
stitions of a superficial intellectualisra has been the fancy
that belief should always be the product of formal logical nro-
cesses. But, in fact, the great body of our fundamental be-
liefs are not deductions, but rather formulations of life. Our
practical life has been the great source of belief and the con-
stant test of its practical validity, that is, of its truth .
, • .In this way the great organism of belief is built up. It
grows out of life itself. . .At last life and experience them-
selves are installed as the great source of practical belief,
and we have sufficiently recovered from the [superstition of in-
tellectualismHo be able once more to trust the order of life
and our moral and spiritual interest. . . .resolute adherence to
experience is a counsel of perfection which cannot be too much
insisted upon.” ^
”Not to form abstract theories, but to formulate and under-
stand this personal life of ours is the first and last duty of
philosophy. This must be done in its own terms . To tell us
that this life as lived is a case of matter and motion is non-
sense. To tell us that this life is explained by matter and
motion is equally nonsense. This is simply to introduce an
(’’Personalism” pp. 310-313)
Jo Siuss'i srf.t ni tas'i Joiinso av5 jArf^ .limbs
-ni bna absan Isoxjos'iq siii nl rliisl a-io Jiosd iisl .tBom iua
.sTtiX lo aiae'iai
-ni ^nivvona en.t v.d 'leiter/; airiJ ni bagiar: v;iis^'i2s Q'ip isV'"
-Tegua io anO .laiiacf lo s'iuisn Is&iics'xq ebi oini irfgle
^cnsl ©n.l n.'^fr-d asrf ir.siisJjioeXIaini Isiox'i'isq.us s lo anox.tiia
-oner isi»no'^ Jo Xo.oboncr srii &d biuori.-? g:ei.Iod :Tsrfi
-sd i sinamBbmrg •U'O -^bed ieeng arf.t ni tJ'ijS »as88so
TirO Jo snoii alumnol nerU-si ii’d anoiionbefo ion ens alaxX
-ron erii i>rrs Jelled Jo eonuoe iaong oni need a»d eJil isoiiesgn
- rliuni aii Jo , 2 l isdi ,YdlbiXxjv isoiiosnn gji Io ..faei insls
iX .fTL' iliud si Isilod Jo mainB^.no tsQ'ig erii airii nl. . .
"merit eoneineaxe bns eJil issX iXi. . .'Uea-ti a'tlX 'lo iuo awoig
,geiX 9d leoiiosng Jo ecnuoa taeng 9x1* se baiisisni ens sevles
-ni Jo noi *'iJ»''j.ugu3 exii mon'"! bo'iavooa'i ’s^Xingioil'U's ovstd sw bn'^
e'iXX ?o 'i;>bno ©ni tanni oi o'loxn 6ono ©Ids 8d oi insilBixic t XXei
oi aonenedba &ii.io39'T. . .ieeieini Isjuixniqs bna Xsnom nxxo bns
iioum ooi ed ionnso rlDiriw noiioal'ien lo loenx'oc s aX eDfieioecixe
-a- ”.noati beisisni
-nsbnt; bns oieli/xmol ol iud .eoXnoedi ioBn.tsds nnol oi
lo 'clnb iseX bns tanil ©n't ai anxio lo elii. Xsnosneg aidJ on^ia
sir I let or . sinnei n^c six rti 9: -.c b . Jainv, aidT . ’^rlaoacX.idg
-non ai noitom bns nstlBrn lo oaao s si beviX sa alii sifit tsilt
bra 'j^ettyTT y,d bonisXqxs ai elil exrfi isrit ar Jlei oT .eanoe
ns soiibonini ot Y-^dxxiis si aidT .asnoanon i^XIaupe ax noitom
(SIS-OI? ,ga .’’aiaiisnos'i©'!”)
35
abstraction from experience as explanation of experience. . . •
For us nature is only an order of uniformity, (established and
maintained by an ever living and ever acting Intelligence and
Will..;. And this uniformity so far from (oppressing us or de-
stroying our freedom, is the absolute presupposition of our
having any freedom or rational life whatever.” if
We must not think, however, that by this use of language
Bowne could possibly be accused of sanctioning Bergson’s ”In-
tuitionalism” . Bowne makes the above statement, not at the
beginning of his entrance upon philosophical discussion, but
at its close, with reference to practical application to life.
His interest is ethical and, above all, theistic and religious.
On the other hand, Bergson makes this reliance upon life
more thorough going. [Knowledge is not relative if we exercise
the instinctive and intuitive powers of the soul^ ^Bergson in-
dicates not merely a(practical application of life to experi-
ence, but an active participation of life in reality. Bowne
exhibits a practical rise above relativism.y Bergson seeks to
transcend relativism and reaches the absolute by way of intui-
tion. Bergson seeks not only belief as does Bowne, but knowl-
edge .
(’’Personalism”. Bowne. pp. 318-319)
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CHAPTER II.
SUBJECTIVE FACTORS IN THOUGHT, SPACE AND TIME.
In our contrast of these two systems, we now turn from
the more general consideration of the possibility of knowl-
edge to a more specific examination of certain radical dif-
ferences in the respective treatments of the categories of
time and space made by these writers. As previously noted,
with Bowne the method is rational, while with Bergson the em-
pirical predominates.
Bowne 's antipathy to exnerimental psychology and the em-
pirical attitude of mind is seen in the following: ”What is
the metaphysical nature of space and how is it related to the
things which are said to be in it? We exclude all inquiry
into the psychological genesis of the idea as irrelevant; for
the history of a notion never decides its meaning and validi-
ty when it appears. Every idea has a nsychological history
which might conceivably be written; but the meaning and worth
of an idea can be determined only by study of the idea itself
as given in consciousness. Neither the geometrical nor the
metaphysical properties of space (and, incidentally of time
also,) can be discovered by either physiological or psychologi-
cal theorizing.” ^
Bergson begins his discussion of the intuition of time
by a careful analysis of states of consciousness. His entire
vk ( ’’Metaphysics. ” Bowne. p. 19A)
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discussion in "Time and Free Will” is psychological and em-
pirical, and nowhere does he go outside the realm of human
personality. Universal mind, as a deus ex machina . does not
enter in either as foundation or as buttress for his argument."
He deals with time in its bearing upon one of the great puz-
zles of human life and thought, namely freedom and necessity.
Bowne starts with the Kantian hypothesis and seeks to
render it more comprehensive by adding to it a definite theis-
tic interpretation. The following brief outline of Bowne ’s
teaching makes evident this theistic intent.
^Thought is the source of temporal relations; and for
their meaning(we must fall back upon experience,^rather than
^
Q.
any reflection on abstract temporal category.
"Time, then, is not an ontological fact but is essentially
a function of self-conscious intelligence." ^
"Time certainly is something real, namely, the real form
of our internal intuition."
"There remains the empirical reality of time only, as the
condition of all our experience, while absolute reality cannot,
be conceded to it. Time is nothing but the form of our inter-
nal intuition. [lake away the peculiar condition of our sensi-
bility, and the idea of time vanishes, because it is not inher-
ent in the objects, but in the subject that perceives them."
^ ("Metaphysics". Bowne. p.l86)
("Kant and Spencer”. Bowne. p.l53)
( Ibid p.l54, quoting Kant.)
-me bns IeolsoXof^O'\(;s<T si
n.sou/fl 'iO mlfisi srf-i
^on aeob ,
, tnsflw/jf'ifi siri *^0*^
’’XIIW biiB amlT" ni noisei/osib
.tLfc og erl 3eob bn 3 ^iBOiiiq
,s 3 a ^bnifti 183‘isvinw snosiaq
3 3 -to nolisbnno'^ 8.3 isri^is ni neine
snn ieeng orli *^o sno noorn gninsad six ni
air.li iiflvf sisab aH
.XtisBessn bna mobss-n liX^man .Jrtsuoilb bna
six! namufi 'bo sols
oj ajisaa fans iisetifoa^cl naWnsH arij rfJxw
sfansia snwoa
axotlb aXinlbab s JX oJ snibbe svleneria-wnioo
9-iora tl tabriDi
a'snwoa bo snXXJuo bsind B«X«"oXXob sril
.noiiaio'iq'iaJnx oxX
..tno.tni oivtsiorii siiii inabiva aa'xfsGT gnidoi^ai
loq bns ?3noxi.el9'i Istocnrei lo aonxfos
ed.f ai idgiiOilT’*
rxBfiS nariien .eonsl'teqxe noqu iiosci Ilel
iaum ew gniimaiTi nxadi
.xnogai.eo Xfl'ioq.'nal ioanisda no noiioella’i
yXIeiinaaa© si ind tCB*i laoigoXodno hb don si
«narii .smiT**
it ” .oonaglXXatni snoxoafioo-'t! ea lo noi tonn’t
s
fino'^ Xsen odd .iBon gnirid onios
si ^inisdnao aaiiT"
i>it ’’.noidiiJdni lannadnl nt;o *10
edd 8s ,yXno emid ‘>0 xSllBen Xaciniqma arid
enieman onadT^’
.donneo .^dilaan eduloada aX,idw .aonaMeqxo nuo
Ub lo noidibxooo
-'lotni nuo '10 mnoq edt dud gniddon sx smiT .di
od bsbaorioo ad
-ienae *iuo lo noidibnoo ncxii/oeq add asisT
.noidiudnx X.sn
-'larini don si ii s 3i/«ood ^sertainsv oaiid lo aabi
add bnB ,\;diiXd
#itii ".(ijedd ssviaonoq dad.t doetdus arid ni dx;d ,sdoatdo
add ni dna
(36X»q ‘OnwoH * ’*aoi3V,dqadaM" ) «•
(SoX.d .anwod . "'loonsqa one dna-H**)
'(,dnB/l gnidoirp ,l»aX.<; bidi )
Time according to Bowne can be interpreted only from the
side of experience, and more especially from that of self-con-
sciousness. Experience is not in the present as a senarate
point of time, but rather that present is in experience. We
cannot define the present as a point in independent time as it
is only a special relation in consciousness.
’’Time is primarily the form of individual exnerience, and
would remain relative to the individual were it not for the ex-
istence of the cosmic order which marks the cosmic time, and
furnishes the common timepiece by which our individual times
are regulated. But even this does not remove the relativity
of time. We have seen that this process gives no time order
until it is related to conscious intelligence; and the temporal
judgment will vary with the powers of the one judging.” *
*• We cannot have experience in the present, but we con-
stitute the present by the actual in experience. But the
range of this experience varies with the range of our cowers.
”The present, then, is no point in absolute time, but a re-
lation in conscious experience; end its measure and contents de-
pend on the range of our powers. Every intellect transcends
time as a mental form; but the finite mind remains under the law
of time as a limitation, by virtue of its finitude.” VfVk
Bowne *s complete discussion of time may be summed up as
follows. Time is primarily an order of relation in our
^ ("Metaphysics.” p.l88)
iHt ( Ibid C.189)
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experience. We are not to think of the possibility of real
ontological time separate from intelligence in which things
and events really occur.
^
Time and change must be referred to
intelligence as cause. It is finally impossible to think if
we give substantiality to either time or change, apart from
thought.
Experience gives color and meaning to time. The self
experiences time in an indivisible act and hence is conscious
of temporal relations. The intellect has the time-relating
power within, and without the unifying act of the unitary self
the experience of time would be impossible.
Furthermore, in all his discussion of time Bowne is in-
sistent that while time may well be something substantial and
real with relation to our thought it is not however to be con-
sidered as something real and substantial with relation to all
thought. Theism results. There is no alternative for other-
wise thought itself would be impossible.
Like Bowne, Bergson offers a distinct thesis in his theory
of time; but unlike Bowne, he does not make use of the rational /
procedure of Kant. The a priori gives way to the empirical
with its analysis of states of consciousness. Bowne studies
the ontology of time and asks not ”how we come to a notion of
time, but what it stands for after we get it.” « /Bergson re-
verses this order and examines the time experience itself in
actual states of consciousnessr^ The question of process is a
it ("Metaphysics”. Bowne. p.164)
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vitel matter with Bergson and bears upon his interpretation of
the category of time.
Bergson’s treatment of time is purely psychological. If
we are to measure time we must first deal with the intensity of
relation to such states? Hence his first question is: ’’Can
there be quantitative differences in conscious states?’*/
Bergson makes the point that the term ’’magnitude” can be
applied only to space, and that if we are to speak of intensity
with reference to states of consciousness, the terms ’’magnitude”
and ’’intensity” are to be understood not in a quantitative but
in a qualitative sense. We cannot speak of the magnitudes of
consciousness. Hence Bergson distinguishes two sorts of quan-
tity, one applicable to the extensive which can be measured, and
one applicable to the intensive which cannot be measured. An
in-extensive quantity is a contradiction. Neither can we dis-
tinguish intensity with reference to objective causes, for we
judge of ’’intensity of effect without even knowing the nature
of the cause, much less its magnitude: indeed, it is the very
intensity of the effect which often leads us to venture an hy-
pothesis as to the number and nature of the causes, and thus to
revise the judgment of our senses, which at first represented
them as insignificant.” «
Furthermore, according to Bergson we cannot exnlain in-
tensity by any molecular movement within the organism. At
conscious states
^
(^But, how is quantity to be conceived with
^ (”Tim.e and Free Will.” p.5)
..
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this stage in his argument, Bergson is seen to be thoroughly
Kantian in that he clearly distinguishes between the sensation,
that is, the actual nerve-changes or brain-changes and the men-
tal reaction which gives the perception. Clearly this is an
acceptance of the theory of the Kantian in preference to that
of the Sensational School. Bergson at this noint could have
insinuated a discussion of the unitary character of the self
and so have strengthened his argument.
By studying the facts of desire, the emotions of joy and
sorrow, Bergson finds that their successive stages are in reali-
ty qualitative, and in no sense quantitative. The increasing
intensities are really different feelings. Aesthetic and moral
feelings also clearly reveal, not a quantitative, but a qualita-
tive, difference. Moreover from a study of the purely physio-
logical conditions we see that the intensity of violent em.o-
tions and deep-seated feelings (which are simple states) is
measured by the magnitude of the involuntary movement which fol-
lows the stimulus. The sensations of sound, of pitch, of heat"^
and cold, become effective end are measured by the attendant re-
actions. We do not measure the sensations by any quantitative
scheme, but by the extent of the organism involved. We cannot
speak of the magnitudinal differences of sensations. Our terms
must always be qualitative.
Hence Bergson concludes that the notion of intensity pre-
sents itself under a double aspect , -’’According as we study the
states of consciousness which represent an external cause or
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those which are self-sufficient. In the former case the per-
ception of intensity consists in a certain estimate of the mag-
nitude of the cause by means of a certain quality in the effect;
— in the second case, we give the name of intensity to the larg-
er or smaller number of simple nsychic phenomena which we con-
jecture to be involved in the fundamental state; it is no long-
er an acquired perception, but a confused perception. In fact,
these two meanings of the word usually intermingle, because the
simpler phenomena involved in an emotion or an effort are general
ly representative, and because the majority of representative
states, being at the same time affective, themselves include a
multiplicity of elementary psychic phenomena. The idea of in-
tensity is thus situated at the junction of two streams, one of
which brings us the idea of extensive magnitude from without
while the other brings us from within, in fact from the very
depths of consciousness the image of an inner multiplicity.” *
The question now arises as to the relation of this image to
number. Is this relation capable of numerical statement or is
it something entirely apart from numerical consideration? We
find that there are two kinds of multiplicity:- "Quantitative or
discrete multiplicity involves the intuition of space but the
multiplicity of conscious states is wholly qualitative. This
unfolding multiplicity constitutes duration, which is a suc-
cession without distinction, an interpenetration of elements so
heterogeneous that former states can never recur. The idea of
« ("Time and Free Will”, pn. 72,73)
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8 homogeneous and measurable time is shown to be an artificial
concept, formed by the intrusion of the idea of space into the
realm of pure duration," %
In this connection Bergson introduces a discussion of
number and develons the thought that we cannot form an idea of
number without an accompanying intuition of snace. He says,-
"Every number is a collection of units, and on the other hand
every number is itself a unit. When we assert that number is
a unit, we understand by this that we master the whole of it by
a simple and indivisible intuition of the mind; this unity thus
includes a multiplicity, since it is the unity of a whole. It
seems, then, that there are two kinds of units, the one ultimate
out of which a number is formed by a process of addition, and
the other provisional, the number so formed, which is multiple
in itself and owes its unity to the simplicity of the act by
which the mind perceives it. — By looking more 'closely into
the matter, we shall see that all unity is the unity of a simple
act of the mind, end that, as this is an act of unification,
there must be some m.ultiplicity for it to unify."
Bergson goes on to ask "If, in order to count states of con
sciousness, we have to represent them symbolically in space, is
it not likely that this symbolical representation will alter the
normal conditions of the inner perception? — Representative
sensation, looked at in itself, is purely quality; but seen
* {”Time and Free Will," Translator's Preface VII.)
("Time and Free Will." p. 80)
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through the mediuir of extensity, this quality becomes in a
certain sense quantity, and is called intensity. In the same
way our projection of our psychic states into space in order
to form a discrete multiplicity is likely to influence these
states themselves and to give them in reflective conscious-
ness a new form, which immediate perception did not attri-
bute to them. — Now, when we speak of time, we generally
think of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states
are ranged alongside one another as in space, so as to form
a discrete multiplicity. Would not time, thus understood,
be to the multinlicity of our psychic states what intensity
is to certain of them,- a sign, a symbol, absolutely distinct
from true duration?" ^
Students of Bowne will readily recall the manner in which
he discussed time with reference to "before and after".
Whether or not his argument intended it, we could easily see
that there was in his thought a. need for this precise distinc-
tion which Bergson makes. The very way in which Bowne would
speak of "before and after" and divide it with his gesture
created the impression that there was in his measurement of
time a failure to apply the term in its qualitative sense as
distinguished by Bergson. His illustrations were m.s.inly of
the spatial and quantitative order and there is not to be found
in his writings a suggestion that he clearly made this important
distinction.
* ("Time and Free Will". p.90)
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To follow Bergson at this point requires extreme care.
Space is to be defined as homogeneous. How about time? Is
it homogeneous? If so, time must therefore be considered as
spatial and such time is simply a ’’bastard soace”. If snace
is to be defined as homogeneous ”it seems that inversely every
homogeneous and unbounded medium will be space. For homo-
geneity here consists in the absence of every quality and it
is hard to see how two forms of the homogeneous could be dis-
tinguished from one another. Nevertheless it is generally
agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium, different from
space but homogeneous like the letter: the homogeneous is
thus supposed to take two forms, according as its contents co-
exist or follow one another. It is true that, when we make
time a homogeneous medium in which conscious states unfold
them.selves, we take it to be given all at once, which amounts
to saying that we abstract time from duration. This sim.ple
consideration ought to warn us that we are thus unwittingly
falling back upon space, and really giving un time. Moreover,
we can understand that miaterial objects, being exterior to one
another and to ourselves, derive both exteriorities from the
homogeneity of a medium which inserts intervals between them
and sets off their outlines; but states of consciousness, even
when successive, permeate one another and in the simplest of
them the whole soul can be reflected. We may therefore sur-
mise that time, conceived under the form of a homogeneous medi-
um, is some spurious concept, due to the trespassing of the
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idea of space upon the field of pure consciousness. At any
rate, we cannot finally admit two forces of the homogeneous,
time and space, without first seeking whether one of them
cannot be reduced to the other.
’’Now, externality is the distinguishing mark of things
which occupy space, while states of consciousness are essen-
tially external to one another, and become so only by being
spread out in time, regarded as a homogeneous medium. If,
then, one of these two supposed forms of the homogeneous,
namely, time and space, is derived from the other, we can
surmise a nriori that the idea of space is a fundamental da-
tum. But misled by the anparent simplicity of the ides of
time, the philosophers who have tried to reduce one of these
ideas to the other have thought that they could make extensity
out of duration. While showing how they have been misled we
shaj.1 see that time conceived under the form of an unbounded
and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of snace
haunting the reflective consciousness.”
Thus does Bergson argue that pure duration, divorced from
"the ghost of space" is wholly qualitative and our only way of
measuring duration must naturally be symbolic. Time as dealt
with by the astronomers and scientists in general is time
treated as static. They do not study motion itself, but the
moving body at rest in certain points of snace. In other
words, they utterly banish time as duration, and treat all
Vr ("Time and Free Will", pp. 98,9?)
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things as static. Time in the sense of qualitative duration
is apart from their thought.
This distinction is important. We thus recognize that
there are two kinds of multiplicity, - a quantitative and
qualitative, and that only the qualitative form of multi-
plicity can be applied to time. However it is impossible
to arrive at this truth without applying the method of intui-
tion. By eliminating the superficial psychic states we no
longer perceive homogeneous time or measure duration, but real-
ly feel it to be wholly qualitative. There are consequently
two forms of multinlicity
;
one which can be measured statical-
ly and apart from life and consciousness; the other which must
be qualitatively considered.
”ln order to recover this fundamental self, as the unso-
phisticated consciousness would perceive it, a vigorous effort
of analysis is necessary, which will isolate the fluid inner
states from their im.age, first refracted, then solidified in
homogeneous space. In other words, our perceotions
,
sensa-
tions, emotions and ideas occur under two aspects: the one
clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever
changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold
of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-
place forms without making it into public property. If we have
been led to distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two forms of
duration, we must expect each conscious state taken by itself,
to assume a different aspect according as we consider it within
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a discrete multiplicity or a confused multiplicity, in the
time as quality, in which it is produced, or in the time as
quantity, into which it is projected, *• a
At this point we should notice Bergson’s refutation of
the associationalists * theory, "The mistake of association-
ism is that it did away with the qualitative element in the
act to be performed and retained only the geometrical and im-
personal element; with the idea of this act, thus rendered
colorless, it was then necessary to associate some specific
difference to distinguish it from many other acts. But this
association is the work of the associationist philosopher who
is studying mind, rather than that of the mind itself,"
The application of this line of argument to the question
of freedom becomes apparent when we consider the confused con-
ception of popular thought brought about by the solidifying
effects of language and symbolism, Bergson contends that the
whole problem of freedom and necessity is solved at once when
the intuitional method is applied and life permitted to ex-
press its conviction. The main drift of his argument is that
our difficulties arise from taking up our stand after the act
has been performed, and from applying the conceptual method of
argumentation. "From the point of view of the living, devel-
oping self, these difficulties are shown to be illusory, and
freedom, though not definable in abstract or conceptual terms,
•it ("Time and Free Will"
it* ( Ibid p. 161)
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is declared to be one of the clearest facts established by
observation.” m
As this part of Bergson’s discussion bears but incident-
ally upon our general theme we quote only his final conclu-
sions. ’’Every demand for explanation in regard to freedom
comes back, without our suspecting it, to the following
question: ’Can time be adequately represented by space?’ to
which we answer; Yes, if you are dealing with time flown; No,
if you are speaking of time flowing. Now, the free act takes
place in time which is flowing and not in time which has al-
ready flown. Freedom is therefore a fact, and among the
facts which we observe there is none clearer. All the diffi-
culties of the problem., and the problem itself, arise from the
desire to endow duration with the same attributes as extensity,
to interpret a succession by a simultaneity, and to express the
idea of freedom in a language into which it is obviously un-
translatable.”
Bergson in ’’Time end Free Will” takes issue with the Kan-
tian and modern psychology which show that v;e perceive things
through the medium of certain form.s borrowed from our consti-
tution. He sets himself the opposite nroblem and asks:
’’...whether the most obvious states of the ego itself, which
we believe that we grasp directly, are not mostly perceived
through the medium of certain forms borrowed from the external
» (’’Time and Free Will”, Translator’s Preface VIII.)
i'tist (’’Time and Free Will”, p. 221)
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world which thus gives us back what we have lent it.
For, assuming. that the forms alluded to, into which we fit mat-
ter, come entirely from the mind, it seems difficult to apply
them constantly to objects without the latter soon leaving a
mark on them: by then using the forms to gain a knowledge of
our own person we run the risk of mistaking for the coloring
of the self the reflection of the frame in which we nlace it,
i.e. the external world. But one can go further still and as-
sert that forms applicable to things cannot be entirely our own
work, that they must result from a comprom.ise between matter and
mind, that if we give much to matter we probably receive some-
thing from it, and that thus, when we try to grasp ourselves
after an excursion into the external world, we no longer have
our hands free.’* *
Mind is in no sense spatial and the intensity of a simple
psychic state is purely quality and our conscious states are not
a discrete multiplicity, but rather a qualitative multinlicity
.
"Outside us, mutual externality without succession; within us,
succession without mutual externality," this is the Bergson ul-
timate of intuition. "Duration - restored to its original nuri-
ty, will appear as wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute
heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another."
"In whatever way,- freedom is viewed, it cannot be denied except
on condition of identifying time with space; it cannot be de-
fined except on condition of demanding that snace should
^ ("Time and Free Will." p. 223) (Ibid pp. 227-229)
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adequately represent time; it cannot te argued about in one
sense or the other except on condition of previously confus-
ing succession and simultaneity. All determinism will thus
be refuted by experience,
There are, so to speak two different selves,”- one of which
is, as it were, external projection of the other, its spatial
and, so to speak, social representation. We reach the former
by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states
as living things constantly becoming , as states not amenable
to measure, which permeate one with another and of which the
succession in duration has nothing in common with juxtaposition
in homogeneous space. But the moments at which we thus grasp
ourselves are rare, and that is just why we are rarely free.”
”i\ant*s great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous
medium. He did not notice that real duration is made up of
moments inside one another, and that when it seems to assume the
form of a homogeneous whole, it is because it gets expressed in
space. Thus the very distinction which he makes between space
and time amounts at bottom to confusing time with space, and
the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego itself.
He thought that consciousness was incapable of perceiving psychic
state otherwise than by juxtaposition, forgetting that a medium
in which these states are set side by side and distinguished
from one another is of course space, and not duration. He was
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thereby led to believe that the same states can recur in the
depths of consciousness, just as the same physical phenomena
are repeated in space; this at least is what he implicitly ad-
mitted when he ascribed to the casual relation the same meaning
and the samte function in the inner as in the outer world. Thus
freedom was made into an incomprehensible fact."
The last passage makes clear that from the standpoint of
the living and conscious being time is a totally different
thing from discrete homogeneous time in the sense in which
science uses it. "—We should see that if these past states
cannot be adequately expressed in words or artificially recon-
structed by a juxtaposition of simpler states, it is because in
their dynamic unity and wholly qualitative multiplicity they are
phases of our real and concrete duration, a heterogeneous dura-
tion and a living one. We should see that, if our action was
pronounced to be free, it is because the relation of this action
to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by a
law, this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable ever
to occur again. We should see, finally that the very idea of
necessary determination here loses every shred of meaning, since
there cannot be any question either of foreseeing the act before
it is performed or of a reasoning about the possibility of the
contrary action once the deed is done, for to have all the con-
ditions given is, in concrete duration, to place one’s self at
the very moment of the act and not to foresee it."
a ("Time and Free Will." p.*?32) (Ibid p.P39)
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In the above discussion of time, there is no decided oppo-
sition to the Kantian system, if we consider the sweep of Berg-
son’s thought and do not deal with unessentials. Bergson
everywhere takes the reactive nature of thought for granted.
When he considers the forms of intellect and their bearing up-
on experience Bergson makes a decided advance over Kant's
"Critique". Throughout "Time and Free Will" Bergson does not
definitely consider the external reality of time and space —
that may or may not be — rather does he undertake to define
and distinguish them and show how they can be understood only by
a vital intuition in experience. Time is not something that
goes on necessarily apart from all intelligence, time is rather
the form which intelligence and intuition give to experience.
Bergson deals with time not in a discrete, spatial sense but by
a new method, namely, - intuition. For him the ultimate under-
standing of time is realized only in a vital concent of duration,
a duration no longer understood as quantitative but as qualita--
tive. All of which argument amounts to the statement that to
understand the forms of thought we must add to the nrocesses of
intellect the knowledge-finding power realized by intuition in
experience
.
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OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF THE SUBJECTIVE FACTORS.
The preceding chapters indicate the methods whereby Eowne
and Bergson have developed their divergent eoistemologies . An
attempt has been made to contrast the different methods emnloy-
ed by the respective characterizations of knowledge as rational
and intuitional. This difference is strikingly annarent where
the philosophers discuss time and space as forms of thought re-
lated to experience. While Bowne makes full use of the purely
k priori method, Bergson adds to this rational procedure the em-
pirical method of intuition. The unitary character of the ego
is one of the main issues with Bowne and is fully demonstrated
in his writings. While this subject is not of so vital moment
with Bergson, it is nevertheless implied and in several passages
announced with almost axiomatic certainty. By an examination
of the treatments of the deeper questions of time and space we
shall discover further contrasts in the conclusions of these
thinkers regarding the question as to the external validity of
the subjective factors in the thought process.
In ’’Time and Free Will” Bergson has shown that we attain a
clear understanding of time, not from the standpoint of mathe-
matics and language, but from the standooint of experience and
life. Freedom is realized as a fact. The problem of the ob-
jective validity of our subjective processes is treated with
thoroughness in ’’Matter and Memory”. The principle of
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intuition as a revealer of knowledge is therein applied to the
problem of the relation of the mind to the body and of the body
to all external reality. Bergson's conclusion is that we have,
by the agency of thought and nerve with its attendant sensation,
actual narticipa tion in the external world. There are no
"noumena" apart from thought.
Professor Eowne approaches this discussion from an entirely
different angle. He does not hold to any demonstration from
psychology, rather is he concerned with the underlying ontologi-
cal and rational considerations. Bowne is eager to prove the
reality and unitary character of the soul. This question does
not seem to obtrude itself to an appreciable extent in Bergson's
thought. Bowne seeks to discredit the associationalist by show-
ing that experience is possible only if there is a unifying fact-
or within the mind itself. He discusses this from purely ration
al rather than exoerimental grounds. Bowne 's position is seen
from the following paragraoh.
*'It is possible to do detailed work in osychology without
in any way going into the metaphysics or the presuoposi tions of
psychology. Detailed studies of the senses, or the general de-
pendence of the mental life on physical conditions, and oretty
much all special questions, are of this sort. Such inquiries
can be carried on on the general basis of experience without
ever asking how experience is possible. It ought, however, to
be possible to distinguish between this familiar fact and the
denial which the phrase seems to imply. Such phrases are not
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needed to express either the problem or its solution. The fact
of experience is exhausted in the discovery that the mental life
has physical processes for its concomitant; and the aim of the
wise man must be to find the law of this concomitance, without
confusing or distorting the fact by importing materialistic
suggestions into it in the guise of figures of speech.”
Bergson is concerned with demonstrating that through the
body one does actually enter into reality. For Bowne this is
no question at all. ”No theory whatever can escaoe this sharp
antithesis of the physical and the mental. It is no soecial
difficulty of spiritualism, but lies with equal or even greater
force against materialism. The materialist and the believer
in double-faced substances cannot give the slightest reason why
a given subjective phase should attend a certain objective phase
and not rather some other. It must be affirmed as an onaque
fact, or else the reason must be found in the plan of the whole.
” The interaction of soul and body takes place under the
organic form. It is not, then, all physical elements, or the
same ohysical elements always, which interact with the soul, but
only those elements which are comprised within the range of an
organic activity; thus the organism seems to be a kind of link
between the inorganic physical and the mental. As ohysical,
it is allied to the world of matter; and, as living, it is al-
lied to the world of mind. Thus it appears in a measure to
mediate the sharp opposition of mind and matter.”
i‘c (’’Metaphysics”. Bowne. p.348) an (Ibid pp. 354-355)
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Concerning the interaction of the body and the soul we
find that Bowne’s discussion is wholly from the standpoint of
metaphysics and not from that of em.nirica.1 psychology. ”— the
soul is posited by the infinite, and the body is simply an or-
der or system of phenomena connected with the soul which re-
produces to some extent features of the 'general phenomenal
order, and which also expresses an order of concomitance with
the mental life. Thus it becomes a visible expression of the
personality, a means of personal communion, and also a means of
controlling to some extent the inner life. The concomitance
is the only interaction there is; and its determining ground
must be sought in the plan and agency of the infinite. — Each
is adjusted to the other in accordance with the nlan of the
whole; but so far as the two factors are concerned, the con-
nection is logical, not dynamic; and any dynamic relation which
we may affirm must be seen to be only a form of sneech.'*
"The physical and mental series are separate and incom-
mensurable; it is conceivable, however, that there should be a
correspondence between them, such that a given state of the one
should always attend a given state of the other."
In the above passages is seen the sharp distinction be-
tween the system of Bowne and that of Bergson. Here is the
contrasted outcome of the method of rationalism and that of in-
tuitionalism. Bowne reaches only "a correspondence" between
("Metaphysics", no. 368-369)
( Ibid p. 370)
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the physical and the mental series and posits the naralleling
infinite. As we have reoeatedly cited, Bergson never makes
use of the infinite as exolanation; he keeps away from the
me tanhysical question and insists that through the body thought
does actually enter into reality in any particular instance of
sensation. This conception of participation marks the real
contrast between the two philosophers, and to my mind shows
the advance which Bergson makes oyer the Kantian relativism,
a relativism not wholly absent from the pages of Bowne.
In treating this relation of body and mind Bergson en-
deavors to take his stand "at the point of view unaware of dis-
putes of the philosophers". The reality of spirit and matter
is affirmed and the book is "frankly dualistic" As defined
by Bergson "matter", however, has a slightly different meaning
from what it usually has. "katter, in our view, is an aggre-
gate of ’images'. And by ’image’ we mean a certain existence
which is more than that the idealist calls a representation ,
but less than that which the realist calls a thing . - an exist-
ence placed half-way between the ’thing’ and ’the renresenta-
tion’. Bergson’s position with reference to the metanhys-
ics involved will disclose itself further on.
Bergson does not attempt to deny that there is close con-
nection between the states of consciousness and the brain; he
does not feel that this fact of correspondence-in-general
a ("Matter and Memory." Bergson. VII
)
( ibid Intro. VI, VII
)
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demonstrates parallelism, which may or may not be true. In
general terms there is far more in the psychical state than can
be discovered in the cerebral. Herein he agrees with Professor
Bowne who stands out against the sensationalists in asserting
that in the act of perception there is added a vital reactive
factor not found in- the brain or in sensation.
Bergson holds that the brain and its correlated substances
are to be considered as instruments designed for action. The
psychical state is cramped by the necessity which our bodies
and minds find for action; the psychical state does, however,
as in diseases of the personality, escape from the cramping
physical and in its diseased freedom declares its unbounded ex-
tent. Hence, strange as it may seem, Bergson studies the
psychical in an un-normal state in order to discover a truth
which in the normal state would not ordinarily be disclosed.
The relation of the body to mind is considered at length
by Bergson, with the conclusion that the nerves which lead to
action, the brain itself and all that takes place therein are
images and that neither the nerves nor nerve centres, can, in
any sense condition the image of the universe. A careful
study of the cerebral substance shows only molecular disturb-
ances and no trace of thought. The brain is, therefore, not
a maker of representations in consciousness, but an instrument
of action,- action first of all induced by sensation and action
transmitted to various parts of our body which is in inter-
action with other images than itself.
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Bergson states at the outset that images belong to two
systems, to science and to consciousness. The body is an
image occupying a central place among images, and by it all
others are conditioned; at each of its movements everything
changes, as though by a turn of a kaleidoscope. There is the
system of science where all the images influence each other
according to the stated law; there is the other system of con-
sciousness which has a privileged action upon all these images.
At this point we are helped by a brilliant illustration
in the real Bergson style. ”The brain is no more than a kind
of central telephonic exchange; its office is to allow communi-
cation, or to delay it. It adds nothing to what it receives;
but, as all the organs of perception send it to their ultimate
prolongations, and as all the motor mechanisms of the spinal
cord and of the medulla oblongata have in it their accredited
representatives, it really constitutes a centre, where the
peripheral excitation gets into relation with this or that
motor mechanism, chosen and no longer prescribed. . . In other
words, the brain appears to us to be an instrument of analysis
in regard to the movement received, and an instrument of selec-
tion in regard to the movement executed... (Nowhere) do the ner-
vous elements work with a view to knowledge: they do but indi-
cate a number of Possible actions at once, or organize one of
them." ^Ar
Bergson insists that we must use the m.ethod of intuition
it ("Matter and Memory", pp. 19-BO)
owj oi g.nolsci 39S«3:i isrfj JsaJuo orii la aa^sja noagisd
ns ai '[bod aiiT , szenaojiDanoo at bna sionaioa oJ .sma-Ja'iS
as Ji Yfl far’s .aassirl gnoms esrliT leiJnao s
gnluqiiooo ossrai
gniri^Y-isvs ajrismsvoin ail "to risaa J.a : banoi^ ifanoo ais
aiariJo
aril 31 a-iaril . aqoc.3ofax9is;'i 8 1o n-ibi e id
riaboriJ as .aagnsrio
^ailto riosa aoneuLloi sassmx ad) XIs etariw sonaios 1o
raaiav.a
-noo "to -)i 3)a\a isrixo ail.t ai ooadi ;wsi bsisia arfi oJ
gnitnoooa
.asjsBi aaaiU lis noou noiics begailviio s aail rioiriw aaarrsboioa
noiJsiiBJ’iXi -‘nciXIiict s id baoXarf sis a».' Jnioq ai.it tA
bniiJ ® .'’Sfl.t 9ioin on ai nisdd oriT-' .alila noasis-i
aift ni
-intiBBOO wolia ot at aalTto aJi ; 33fisdoxs oinoriqslaJ
iaxtriao to
;oevi909 "! ti tstlw oJ gniritofi abbs tX -ti 'CsXafa
ot ao .noiJso,
atscritXa iia.iJ ot Ji brtaa noitnooiag to anag'io arit
iXa bo ,Jiid
lanXaa -.rit to sraainsdoafi! -loJora scii Its as bas
.anoit 6snoXo^q
bstifaadooo oietlt ti ni avsit fijognoido sXXt/bam arit to
bns b-ioo
a !t snsriw ,60tr-.ao s astutitsnoo iXisan ti
..asvitstrfSES'jqon
tsrit to -ti!) mttsisi otrii stag noitstioxa isntiiqiiqq
^ariio nl . . . bedinr-aanq nos.noi on fans jiaaorio
.mainansair. nctonn
aJaiXsns to tneqtntani ns ad ot an ot s-ibsoos nimd a.it
.abnow
-ooXss to tnaiauqtsni ns bne .bavtecat .fnsmsvom sit
ot Ensssn nx
-non 9rit Ob (ssariwolt) ...botboaxs tnams-.-om grit ot faxesst
ni noxt
-tbnt tud Ob v.arit : 3sb9 X»ion!( ot ret/ s ritli" iJiow atnomais
bxiov
to 0HO ssxnsgxo no , 9ono ta snoxtcs aldiSBOo to
qadniL’n a stso
nox.ti:uJni "To boriia.'!! edS eau fsam ow t.adS alaxsni
nocis'isa
(Cf:~6I oCfq bns ‘laJiBiv”) <•
61
in order to get behind appearances, and that by so doing we
shall find it distinctly not true that consciousness is born
of the internal movements of the cerebral process. Only
through intuition can we arrive at the fact of perception.
We must do away with recollections, and get back to the in-
tegral act which comnresses a multitude of external moments
with their vibrations, etc., and see how this integral act
makes for a unifying perception. (This act gives us an im-
mediate and instantaneous vision of matter. ) Hence it fol-
lows, that conscious perception is but our power of choice,
reflected from things, as by a mirror. Not all of the ner-
vous sensation is transmitted back into action, but as the or-
ganism is more and more highly developed, the mind, by having
indeterminate lines of action open, holds the perception more
and more, refusing to let it pass back into action. This re-
tarded perception is consciousness
.
’’There is nothing positive here, nothing added to the
image, nothing new. The objects merely abandon something of
their real action in order to manifest their virtual action -
that is to say, in the main, the eventual influence of the
living being upon them This is as much as to say that there
is for images merely a difference of degree and not of kind,
between being and being consciously perceived .” So that
representation results from the omission of that in the totali-
ty of matter which has no interest for our needs, and is limited
•» (’’Matter and Memory”. p.30)
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by a degree of indeterminate action of which the living being
is master. What we have to explain, then, is not how Toerceo-
tion arises, but how it is limited, since it should be the image
of the whole, and is in fact reduced to the image of that which
interests us. But, representation is limited by the degree of
indetermination allowed to the acts of the special image, our
body.
”It is no wonder, then, that everything happens as though
your perception were a result of the internal motions of the
brain, and issued in some sort from the cortical centres.” ^
”The reciprocal dependence of these two terras is therefore
simply due to the fact that both are functions of a third, which
is the indetermination of the will.” ”Peject the share
(which) memory (has in representation), consider perception in
its unmixed state and you will be forced to recognize that there
is no image without an object.”
”Now, if the brain is injured in any way perception is there-
by lessened by the lessened appeal to activity. ’’Perception as
a whole has its true and final explanation in the tendency of
the body to movement.” ’’Perception is no more in the
sensory centres than in the motor centres; it measures the com-
plexity of their relations, and is, in fact, where it appears to
be.”
(’’Matter and Memory” p.35) (Ibid p. 41)
( Ibid p. 35) (ibid p. 43)
( Ibid p. 39)
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Now it is evident from our reading of Bergson that he
means to say that we must begin with the external world
(images), and that we are to consider the human body as one
of these external images: that sensations are but the re-
actions between other external images and the body; that the
sensations travel through their proper channels from the ex-
ternal to the internal mechanism of the body and that, as
they reach centres of indetermination they ere reacted upon
by the will and either turned in the direction of action or
held in the immediate grasp of consciousness. The external
world, the body itself with all its nervous excitation and its
sensations are likewise images. Consciousness is therefore
not a thing apart from images, but an actual fact, itself an
image amidst images. It follows that it is not merely a dif-
ference of degree that separates oerception from affection,
but a difference in kind. Affection differs from perception
in that it is real instead of virtual action. ’’That is to say,
once more, that my perception is outside my body, and my affec-
tion within it.” » But, this pure perception exists only in
theory; in fact, it is always mixed with affection. In other
words, ’’There is no perception without affection. . The truth
is that affection is not the primary matter of which percention
is made; it is rather the impurity with which percention is al-
loyed.” Everything is clear ”if we start from renresenta-
tion itself, that is to say, from the totality of nerceived
(’’Matter and Memory”, n.59) (Ibid p.60)
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images. My perception, in its pure state, isolated from memo-
ry, does not go on from my body to other bodies; it is, to be-
gin with, in the aggregate of bodies, then gradually limits
itself and adopts my body as a center. And it is led to do
so precisely by experience of the double faculty, which this
body nossesses, of performing actions and feeling affection;
in a word, by experience of the sensory-motor power of a cer-
tain image, privileged among other images, — There is then, in
the aggregate of images, a privileged image, perceived in its
depth and no longer only on the surface — the seat of affec-
tion, and, at the same time, the source of action: It is this
particular image which I adopt as the centre of my universe
and as the physical basis of my personality." »
There is inherent in Bergson’s "Matter and Memory" the same
arguments which Bowne makes for the necessary unity of the self.
However Bergson comes to this question of the self from a dif-
ferent angle, - that of emnirical psychology. He does not
consider sensation so much as he does the mental reaction
against sensation. Our power of effecting changes in the
material of sensation seems to him basal. Our perception is
measured by this power of inner reaction, or as Bergson states,
by indeterraination.
Indetermination requires that images be retained in memory
so that there may be a back-look over the past as well as a nre-
view of the future. And in "Matter and Memory" it is clearly
vt ("Matter and Memory." pp.63,64)
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emphasized that pure memory is not the same as pure percent ion.
Memory is not a faint perception or the continuance of the ner-
ception with modified reverberation in sensation. ’’The a ctual -
itX of our perception lies in its activity , in the m.ovements
which prolong it, and not in its greater intensity: The nast
is only idea, the present is ideo-motor — recognize in pure
perception a system of nascent acts which plunges roots deep
into the real; and at once perception is seen to be radically
distinct from recollection; the reality of things is no more
constructed or reconstructed, but touched, penetrated, lived;
and the problem at issue between realism and idealism, instead
of giving rise to interminable metanhysical discussion, is solved,
or rather dissolved by intuition.” ^
This is Bergson’s great solution of the problem of matter
and mind through the use of the instrument ’’intuition”. Fur-
thermore he believes that it is possible for us to get an ink-
ling of the true nature of matter. ’’The qualitative hetero-
geneity of our successive perceptions of the universe results
from the fact that each, in itself, extends over a certain denth
of duration, and that memory condenses in each an enormous multi-
plicity of vibrations which appear to us all at once, although
they are successive. If we were only to divide, ideally, this
undivided depth of time, to distinguish in it the necessary
multiplicity of moments, in a word to eliminate all memory, we
should pass thereby from oercention to matter, from the subject
n (”Matter and Memory.” pp. 74-75)
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to the object. (Ke concludes) Questions relatinsr to sub -
ject and object. to their distinction and their union, should be
pu t in terms of time rather than of space . " it
’’Just as pure perception, by giving us hints as to the
nature of matter, allows us to take an intermediate position
between realism and idealism, so pure memory, on the other hand,
by opening to us a view of what is called spirit, should enable
us to decide between those other two doctrines, materialism and
spiritualism.”
If we mistake not, Bergson is here saying just what Bowne
has said regarding matter, - that in the last analysis all power
and all expressions of force are spiritual and are to be inter-
preted in terms that are personal. Our only vital experience
of power is personal will and it may be that matter is not some-
thing other than spirit. We are to understand that there is in
matter something more than, but not something different from,
that which is actually given in perception. When we come to
contrast our perception of matter and matter itself we see that
there is not a difference in kind but in degree. Pure percep-
tion stands toward matter as a relation of the part to the whole.
This amounts to saying that matter cannot exercise any powers
other than those which we realize in perception. Matter has no
mysterious noumenal virtue and it can conceal none.
"If it is memory above all that lends to perception its
Vf ("Matter and Memory." pp. 76-77)
iHv ( Ibid pp. 77,78)
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subjective character, the philosophy of matter must aim in the
first instance, at eliminating the contributions of memory. . ,
It follows that memory must be, in principle, a power absolutely
independent of matter. If, then, spirit is a reality, it is
here, in the phenomenon of memory, that we may com.e in touch
with it experimentally. And hence, any attempt to derive pure
memory from an operation of the brain should reveal on analysis
a radical illusion.” ^ Thus a true theory of mem.ory refutes
materialism. ”It is vain to attribute to the cerebral sub-
stance the property of engendering representa tion, ” -jf-n- ”If it
could be positively established that the cerebral process answers
only to a very small part of memory, that it is rather the effect
than the cause, that matter is here as elsewhere the vehicle of
an action and not the substratum of a knowledge . then the thesis
which we are maintaining would be demonstrated by the very ex-
ample which is commonly supposed to be most unfavorable to it,
and the necessity might arise of erecting spirit into an inde-
pendent reality." "/?%-;{
Bergson believes that it is possible for us to enter em-
pirically into the above purely metaphysical problem. He main-
tains that the brain is an instrument of action, and not of re-
presentation and that the difference between perception and re-
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kemory has a double form, - motor mechanisms and inde-
pendent recollection. An act or thought repeated becomes a
habit through the creating of a cerebral mechanism that reacts
without conscious effort when external stimulus is anplied.
Ihe recognition of such an act or thought as having had a like
deed or thought in the past is a thing of an entirely differ-
ent order.
According to Bergson, to recognize an object is from one
standnoint to know how to use it. As a matter of fact we do
commonly act before we become conscious of our recognitions.
If, however, the motor mechanism by which we act is injured
there may follow a failure to act as formerly in response to
stimulus. This failure to act does not necessarily mean that
the memory images have been lost, rather that the power to nut
forth the act that stimulus indicates is lost. Bergson finds
that lesions of the brain may affect these movements, but not
the recollections. A suppression of the motor mechanism nre-
vents the recollections from becoming actual. Memory is in-
tact, although m.ovement into actual recognition is incapable
of realization. There is thus something more to memory than
mere sensations however grouped, - that something is an inner
power of action, which action is mediated by the motor mechanism.
”It is vain, therefore, to treat memory-images and ideas as
ready-made things, and then assign to them an abiding place in
problematical centres. Nor is it of any avail to disguise the
hypothesis under the cover of a language borrowed from anatomy
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and physiology; it is nothing but the association theory of
mind; it has nothing in its favor but the constant tendency
of discursive intellect to cut up all progress into phases
and afterwards to solidify these phases into thin;;s : and since
it is born a priori from a kind of metaphysical prepossession,
it has neither the advantage of following the movement of con-
sciousness nor that of simplifying the explanation of the
facts." yc
From introspection Bergson finds that distinct perception
is brought about by two opposite currents, one centripetal,
coming from the external object; the other centrifugal which
takes its departure from what he speaks of as ’pure memory*.
Passive perception com.es from the former, while actual recol-
lection finds its place in the latter. The union of these
two currents constitutes recognition.
But, if there be real centres of images then the mind is
likely to be a sort of keyboard played upon by miemories much as
the sense organ is played upon by external objects. "The cen-
tres of images, if they exist, can only be the organs that are
exactly symmetrical with the organs of the senses in reference
to the sensory centres. They are no more the depositories of
pure memories, that is, of virtual objects, than the organs of
the senses are depositories of real objects."
Thus Bergson again joins forces with the Kantians against
the associaticnalis ts . We note once more that the matter of
a ("Niatter and Memory." pp. 159, 160) (Ibid p.167;
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the unity of the ego might well have engaged more fully the at-
tention of the philosopher. His charges against the false as-
sumptions of the associational theory of perception are incis-
ive. • *'The capital error of associationism is that it substi-
tutes for continuity of becoming, which is the living
reality, a discontinuous multiplicity of elements, inert end
juxtaposed.” ^ That is, associationism takes solid elements,
places them side by side and makes of memory only a weakened
perception. In vain does it attempt to discover ”in a real-
ized and present state the mark of its past origin, to distin-
guish memory from perception, and to erect into a difference of
kind that which is condemned in advance to be but a difference
of magnitude.” it-*
On looking at the m.atter of action and recognition Eergson
finds that our mem.ories form a chain and that our character al-
ways present in all our acts and decisions is the real synthe-
sizing power that grips all our past states of consciousness and
holds them in a present useful deed. V/e ere not to ask in spa-
tial terms where memories are, rather are we to give back to
duration the sectional fragments into which we divide time and
recognize that we have in duration, not moments external to one
another, but contained within.
Seen from Bergson’s point of view, indeed, our body is no-
thing but that part of our representation which is ever being
born again, the part always present, or rather, that which at
(’’Matter and Memory.” p.l71) Hit (Ibid P.175)
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each moment is just past. "Itself an image, the body cannot
store up images, since it forms a part of the images; and this
is why it is a chimerical enterprise to seek to localize past
or even present perceptions in the brain: They are not in it;
it is the brain that is in them." »
Moreover general ideas, relations of contiguity or of re-
semblance can never be explained by the associationalists . The
discovery of relations is not explanation. Similarity and con-
tinguity do not account for anything unless they are themselves
accounted for. They should be considered first, on the plane
of action, where they coincide; and, secondly, on the plane of
dream where they are entirely different. Now the normal life
oscillates between these t?/o extremes; according to the degree
of tension in memory it is near the plane of action, and becomes
more personal as it draws toward the plane of dream.
Bergson takes uo a discussion of sleep and insanity as bear-
ing upon this particular phase of mental mechanism, and concludes
that sleep and insanity detach m.emory and attention from the sen-
sory-motor functions by which they enter into present reality.
Injuries to the brain affect the motor prolongations through
which memories are actualized, or the sensory-motor equilibrium
whose conditions are attached to life. They cannot destroy mem-
ories. They simply destroy the mechanism through which memories
get into actual contact with life. The final conclusion is, -
"All the facts and all the analogies are in favor of a theory
* ("Matter and Memory." p. 196)
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which regards the brain as only an intermediary between sensa-
tion and movement, which sees in this aggregate of sensations
and movem,ents the pointed end of mental life - a point ever
pressed forward into the tissue of events, and, attributing
thus to the body the sole function of directing memory toward
the real and of binding it to the present, considers memory it-
%
self as absolutely independent of matter." *
While not discussing the question with any degree of ful-
ness Bergson nevertheless hints at a. concention of matter and
spirit and the manner of their union. The problem is one of
undoubted obscurity, which obscurity is due to "the double an-
tithesis which our understanding establishes between the ex-
tended and the unextended on the one side, between quality and
quantity on the other. It is certain that mind, first of all,
stands over against matter as a pure unity in the fact of an
essentially divisible multiplicity; and moreover that our ner-
ceptions are composed of heterogeneous qualities, whereas the
perceived universe seems to resolve itself into homogeneous and
calculable changes. There would thus be inextension and quali-
ty on the one hand, extensity and quantity on the other. We
have repudiated materialism, which derives the first term, from
the second; but neither do we accept idealism, which holds that
the second is constructed by the first. We maintain as against
materialism, that perception overflows infinitely the cerebral
state; but we have endeavored to establish, as against idealism:,
a ("Matter and Memory." p.
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that matter goes in every direction beyond our reoresentation
of it, a representation which the mind has gathered out of it,
so to speak, by an intelligent choice. Of these two opposite
doctrines, the one attributes to the body and the other to the
intellect of a true power of creation, the first insisting that
our brain begets represente.tion,and the second thet our under-
standing designs the nlan of nature. And against these two
doctrines we evoke the same testimony, that of consciousness,
which shows us our body as one image among others and our un-
derstanding as a certain faculty of dissociating, of distin-
guishing, of opposing logically, but not of creating or of
constructing. Thus, willing captives of psychological analy-
sis and consequently of common sense, it would seem that, af-
ter having exacerbated the conflicts raised by ordinary dual-
ism, we have closed all the avenues of escape which metanhysic
might set open to us.” «-
’*The theory of pure perception on the one hand, of nure
mem.ory on the other, may thus prenare the way for a reconcili-
ation between the unextended and the extended, between quali-
ty and quantity.” For since pure nerception is a part of
things, these share in the nature of perception; the idee of
extension. And the heterogeneity of sensible qualities is
due to their contraction in memory; the idea of tension.
’’Memory is, then, in no degree an emanation of matter; on
the contrary, matter, as grasped in concrete perceoticn which
Vf (’’Matter and Memory.” 0 . 236 ) vtii (Ibid 00.236,237;
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always occupies a certain duration, is in great part a work of
memory." it
Eergson's teaching develops the doctrine that intellect
is enslaved to certain bodily necessities and that thought has
been built up in conflict with matter which it has had to dis-
organize for the satisfaction of its wants. If we can only
find out what effect these practical needs have had on thought
and discount them, we may thereby get back of the relative to
the real. Dogmatism and empiricism alike take reality in a
discontinuous form, ignoring the fact of duration.
Applying the intuitional method to matter the following
results. Every movement, inasmuch as it is a passage from
rest to rest is absolutely indivisible. Movem.ent is there-
fore relative only for the mathematician while it is real for
the physicist. Likewise all division of matter into indenen-
dent bodies with absolute and determined outline is also arti-
ficial. Here Bergson reveals an idealistic trend of thought
that makes of matt^^r a state of vibration which, under the
rhythm of duration enters into the consciousness as reality.
The following paragraphs indicate this.
"In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is
possible to imagine many different rhythms which, slower or
faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of differ-
ent kinds of consciousness, and thereby fix their respective
places in the scale of being. To conceive of durations of
it- ("Matter and Memory." pc. J^36,237)
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different tensions is perhans both difficult and strange to our
mind, because we have acquired the useful habit of substituting
for the true duration, lived by consciousness, an homogeneous
and independent Time .—
"
We are told by Bergson that in sleep something other than
the customary self is revealed. Actually one may sleep but a
few minutes and yet in his dream, have passed through many years
of dream-experience. There is in dream a higher tension than
is normally experienced. After making this clear Bergson asks
us to consider the possibility that the whole history of humani-
ty and the universe might, for a consciousness with a higher de-
gree of tension, be compressed into a comparatively brief period.
’*In short, then, to perceive consists in condensing enormous
periods of an infinitely diluted existence into a few more dif-
ferentiated moments of an intenser life, and in thus summing un
a very long history. To perceive means to immobilize.”
Thus our consciousness sums up for us whole neriods of the
inner history of things. ’’But, if you abolish my consciousness,
the material universe subsists exactly as it was; only, since
you have removed that particular rhythm of duration which was
the condition of my action upon things, these things draw back
into themselves, mark as many moments in their own existence as
science distinguishes in it; and sensible qualities without van-
ishing, are spread and diluted in an incomparably miore divided
duration. Matter thus resolves itself into numberless
^ ("Matter and Memory.” p.275) (Ibid p.!?75)
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vibrations, all linked together in uninterrupted continuity,
all bound up with each other, and traveling in every direction,
like shivers through an immense body,” a
Here after a long discussion showing his process of intui-
tion whereby he gets at an intuitive knowledge of matter, Berg-
son asserts that necessity would rule a being which adopted
the rhythm of the duration of matter. But by condensing that
duration into our own, we conquer necessity; for, homogeneous
space and time are the mental diagram of our eventual action
upon matters: they are not properties of things. At this noint
it is hard to grasp the distinction. He says that if we com-




—by setting up homogeneous time and homogeneous space
either as realities that are contemplated or as forms of con-
templation, they both attribute to space and time an interest
which is speculative rather than vita l. Hence there is room,
between metaphysical dogmatism on the one hand and critical
philosophy on the other, for a doctrine which regards homogen-
eous space and time as principles of division and of solidifi-
cation introduced into the real with a view to action and not
with 8 view to knowledge, which attributes to things a real du-
ration and a real extensity, and which, in the end, sees the
source of all difficulty no longer in that duration and in that
extensity (which really belong to things and are manifest to
« ("Matter and Memory,” p.276)
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the mind), but in the homogeneous space and time which we
stretch out beneath them in order to divide the continuous,
to fix the becoming, and provide our activity, with points
to which it can be anplied." *
Bergson insists that idealism and realism both regard the
different orders of sensation as discontinuous, and so miss
the true nature of nercepticn. ‘‘Idealism and realism differ
only in that the first relegates extensity to tactile percep-
tion, of which it becomes the exclusive property, while the
second thrusts extensity yet further back, outside of all per-
ception. But the two doctrines are agreed in maintaining the
discontinuity of the different orders of sensible qualities,
and also the abrupt transition from that which is purely ex-
tended to that which is not extended at all. Now the princi-
pal difficulties which they both encounter in the theory of
perception arise from this common postulate.'*
Hence it follows that, if matter is to be considered in
terms of duration and, with the thought in mind that m.atter is
vibration, the distinction between body and mind is to be es-
tablished no longer in terms of space as has been our habit in-
duced by the necessity for action, but in terms of time.
Bergson feels that it is true that such psychology must
also be bound up with a metaphysics of the same sort. ‘‘The
difficulties are less formidable in a dualism which, starting
* (**Matter and Memory.” pp. 281, ?8?)
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from pure perception, where subject and object coincide, fol-
lows the development of the two terras in their respective du-
rations, - matter, the further we push its analysis, tending
more and more to be only a succession of infinitely rapid mo-
ments which may be deduced each from the other and thereby are
equivalent to each other : spirit being in perception already
memory, and declaring itself more and more as a prolonging of
past into the present, a progress, a true evolution.” »
”If matter does not remember the past, it is because it
repeats the past unceasingly, because, subject to necessity, it
unfolds a series of moments of which each is the equivalent of
the preceding moment and may be deducted from it: thus its past
is truly given in its present. But a being which evolves more
or less freely creates something new every moment: in vain, then,
should we seek to read its past in its present unless its past
were deposited within it in the form of memory. Thus, to use
again a metaphor which has more than once appeared in this book,
it is necessary, end for similar reasons, that the pest should
be acted by matter and imagined by mind.” Vru
The argument is, in brief, that the body is only an instru-
ment of action and that perception and memory, since they Point
to action are not mere duplicates of each other. If we could
draw aside the curtain which has been lowered between knowledge
and reality, by reason of the solidifying effect of necessary
* (”katter and Memory.” p. 295)
iiii ( ibid pp. 297,298;
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action, we could by intuition enter into ” things-in-them-
selves.
Of course, perception only gives us a part of these
things and therein does Bergson approach close to Kant. "It
is not subjective, for it is in things rather than in me.
It is not relative, because the relation between the ’nhe-
nomenon’ and the 'thing* is not that of appearance to reali-
ty, but merely that of the part to the whole." a
The brain is not, as Bergson would say, the cause of ner-
ception nor its effect, nor in any sense its duplicate. The
brain but continues sensation which is reacted upon by the
mind and thus in passing from nure perception to memory we'
definitely abandon matter for spirit. For, - " IvieTrory is
something; other than a func ti on of the brain and there is not
merely a difference of degree, but of kind, between •percention
and recollection ." "With mem.ory we are in very truth in
the domain of spirit." mui This is fundamental and carries
us back to the ooening words of the introduction, - ’’This book
affirms the reality of spirit and the reality of matter, and
tries to determine the relation of the one to the other by the
study of a definite example, that of memory. It is, then,
frankly dualistic."
One notes here a decided contrast between Bergson and
^ ("Matter and Mem.ory." p. 306)
( Ibid p. 315)
( Ibid p. 320)
("Matter and Memory." Intro. VII
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Bowne. Bowne tries dualism and finds it wanting in power to
sustain thought, and comes to a thorough-going spiritual mon-
ism by positing behind the processes we call matter the World-
Ground of spirit. But in any practical discussion it is quick-
ly seen that from the standpoint of human experience Bowne would
agree that for all our purposes we must treat the external as
though it were in fact apart from our thought, even if not apart
from all thought. There is, however, a decided difference in
the declared positions.
Bowne *s physical position is best stated in his own words.
He agrees with Bergson that it is impossible to construe the
mind ’*as a resultant of the interaction of any number of Physi-
cal or impersonal elements.’* * Both are clear as to the fun-
damental unity of the self. But, when Bowne comes to consider
reality he says, "Reality for intelligence is intelligible in
the forms of intelligence." This reality is independent of
our thought, but, - "This independence of our thought is mis-
taken for an independence of all thought. the illusion rests
upon a failure to distinguish between the phenomenal and the on-
tological reality. . . The world of things can be defined and
understood only as we give up the notion of an extra-mental
reality altogether, and make the entire world a thought world;
that is, a world that exists only through and in relation to in-
telligence. Mind is the only ontological reality. Ideas have
only conceptual reality. Ideas energized by will have
"Metaphysics." Bowne. p. 4?1) (Ibid pp.
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After having discussed the fact of interest in action on
the part of perception and the fact of recollection on the
part of memory, Bergson further elaborates the union of body
and mind. In certain passages his difference in standpoint
from Bowne is made apparent.
"For after having successfully studied pure perception
and pure memory, we still have to bring them together. If
pure recollection is already spirit, and if cure perception
is still in a sense matter, we ought to be able, by placing
ourselves at their meeting place, to throw some light on the
reciprocal action of spirit and matter. That which is given,
that which is real, is something intermediate between divided
extension and pure inextension.” %% "It is not true that
consciousness turned round on itself, is confronted with a
merely internal procession of inextensive perceptions. It
is inside the very things perceived that you put back pure per-
ception, and the first obstacle is thus removed." This is
the fundamental conception of "Matter and Memory" and this pos-
sible penetration into externality is precisely the point at
which we conceive Bergson to have cleared up the Kantian dif-
ficulty involved in his well known doctrine of the "noumena.”
a ("Metaphysics", pp. 422,423)
mi ("Matter and Memory." pn. 325,326)
( Ibid p.328)
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CHAPTER IV.
BEARING OF EPISTEMOLOGY ON COSMOLOGY.
So far this dissertation has considered the validity of
the knowing process, seeking to arrive at the contrasted con-
ceptions in Bowne and Bergson with reference to the subjective
factors of time and space and the objective validity of these
subjective factors in the thought process. We have found
both philosophers to be in substantial agreement as to the re-
active nature of thought, the unity of the self and the validi-
ty of the thought process in general. With regard to the cate-
gories of time and space we have noted the factor added in
Bergson’s conception of the validity of knowledge obtained
through the intuitions. The thought process with Bergson
has in it the double character of ratiocination and intuition-
al insight. This constitutes a vitally new concention of
epistemology.
A clearer understanding of the divergence of these two
epistemologies is realized when we study their resnective
treatments of cosmological problems. Furthermore, since
their epistemological doctrines have been developed quite
largely in their study of cosmology we are obliged to note
their ultimate positions with reference to the World-Ground.
For Bowne this is a world of persons with Supreme Personality
at its head. Nature has no substantial existence apart by
itself, and cannot be considered as a self-running system into
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which intelligent direction does not enter. The world of na-
ture and of persons is throughout dependent, instrumental and
phenomenal. ’’Metaohysics shows that we cannot explain the
existence and community of the many without affirming a fun-
damental reality which is truly one, and which produces and
coordinates the many we reach the result that the unpic-
turable many must be conceived as unpicturably denending on
the unpicturable one." it
Bowne makes evident from this discussion of enis temology
that he considers thought impossible on any other plane than
that of belief in the unity of the World -Ground
,
its freedom,
its personality and finally its ethical quality. This has
appeared many times in our survey of his teaching concerning
the unity of the self end the objective validity of the sub-
jective categories of time and space. Bowne *s entire system
is throughout committed to Theism and he himself gave to his
conclusions the significant title, - "Personalism".
The ultimate conclusions of Bergson’s system are easily
distinguished. Having demonstrated that we cannot enter into
a discussion of these problems on purely rational grounds
alone, but that we must utilize the intuitions for an exact
understanding of the categories and having, by the same nro-
cess, also demonstrated that through the body we do actually
enter into a participation with reality, Bergson then applies
this method to cosmology in his masterpiece of system making, -
% ("Personalism." Bowne. pn. ?78,P79)
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“Creative Evolution” This book contains a discussion of cos-
mology by means of the intuitional method, Bergson summarizes
his system at this juncture.
“The considerations put forward in ’The immediate Data of
Consciousness’ result in an illustration of the fact of liber-
ty: those of ’Matter and Memory’ lead us, I hope, to out our
finger on mental reality; those of ’Creative Evolution’ pre-
sent creation as a fact: from all this we derive a clear idea
of a free and creating God, producing matter and life at once,
whose creative effort is continued, in a vital direction, by
the evolution of species and the construction of human person-
alities.” ^
A casual reader of the pages of Bowne finds that he dis-
cusses the question of cosmolo,gy from the standpoint of the
World-Ground as personal. His interest is metaphysical and
theological and not descriptive of processes. On the other
hand Bergson is interested in showing that by intuition we can
enter into the world process and, by a careful use of natural
science, vastly enlarge our knowledge of that world process.
Bergson discusses world building and Bowne discusses the World-
Ground.
The author of “Creative Evolution” is concerned with find-
ing out what thought plus intuitionalism has to say with regard
to world-process. He seeks light in actual growth of mind and
evolution of the cosmos. That he emerges in the general
a (“New Philosophy,” Le Roy. p.8?5)
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direction of theism we think is quite capable of demonstration.
Indeed we are sure that such is the final interpretation which
an unbiased opinion must ascribe to the Bergsonian System. It
is necessary to read his own words and to follow his reasoning
at some length to see how true this is.
^Theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us insen-
arable. A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criti-
cism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the con-
cepts which the understanding puts at its disposal; it can but
enclose the facts, willing or not, in pre-existing frames which
it regards as ultimate. It thus obtains a symbolism which is
convenient, perhaps even necessary to positive science, but not
a direct vision of its object. On the other hand, a theory of
knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general
evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowl-
edge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge or go beyond
them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, theory of
knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, by
a circular process, push each other on unceasingly.
"Together, they may solve by a method more sure, brought
nearer to experience, the great problem that philosophy poses," •51-
In discussing the evolution of life from the standpoints of
mechanism and teleology, Bergson shows that both positions are
really untrue to the facts, - but that teleology is nearer the
truth. He begins with a discussion of existence as a fact,
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finding that ”for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to
change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating one’s self
endlessly. Should the same be said of existence in general?”
"The universe must be thought of as enduring and hence, as
duration means invention, there is a continual elaboration of
the absolutely new. Evolution is creative in the truest sense
of the word. Hence we can attribute to the universe as a
whole something of the duration which is operative in our own
individuality.”
”
— Like the universe as a whole, like each conscious be-
ing taken separately, the organism which lives is a thing which
endures . Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged into its pre-
sent, and abides there, actual and acting.”
Bergson repudiates the mechanistic explanation of the uni-
verse because ”in such a doctrine time is still spoken of: one
pronounces the word, but one does not think of the thing. For
time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it does nothing it i^
nothing. Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which the
totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in
which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the in-
firmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once. But
duration is something very different from this for our conscious
ness, that is to say, for that which is most indisputable in our
experience. We perceive duration as a stream against which we
cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel,
* (’’Creative Evolution.” p.7) (Ibid p.l5)
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the very substance of the world In which we live. It is of
no use to hold up before our eyes the dazzling prospect of a
universal mathematic; we cannot sacrifice experience to the re-
quirements of a system. That is why we reject radical mechan-
ism.
”But radical finalisra is quite as unacceptable, and for
the same reason. The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme
form, as we find it in Leibniz, for example, implies that things
and beings merely realize a program previously arranged. But
if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the
universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypo-
thesis, here again it is supposed that all is gi ven. Final-
ism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs
from the same postulate, with this sole difference, that in the
movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose
successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds in
front of us the light with which it claims to guide us, instead
of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of the
future for the impulsion of the past. But succession remains
none the less a mere appearance, as indeed does movement itself.
”Yet finalism is not, like mechanism, a doctrine with fixed
rigid outlines. It admits of as many inflections as we like.
The mechanistic philosophy is to be taken or left: it must be
left if the least grain of dust, by straying from the path fore-
seen by mechanics, should show the slightest trace of spontaneity.
(^Creative Evolution." p. 39)
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The doctrine of final causes, on the contrary, will never be
definitely refuted*” % ”If there is finality in the world
of life, it includes the whole of life in a single indivisi-
ble embrace.”
”The error of radical finalism, as also that of radical
mechanism, is to extend too far the application of certain
concepts that are natural to our intellect. Originally, we
think only in order to act. Our intellect has been cast in
the mould of action. Speculation is a luxury, while action
is a necessity. — For that reason, radical finalism is very
near radical mechanism on many points.”
”
—they agree in doing away with time. Real duration is
that duration which gnaws on things, and leaves on them the
mark of its tooth. If everything is in time, everything
changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recurs.
Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract: what is
repeated is some aspect that our senses, and especially our in-
tellect, have singled out from reality, just because our action,
upon which all the effort of our intellect is directed, can
move only among repetitions. — We do not think real time.
But we live it, because life transcends intellect. The feel-
ing we have of our evolution end of the evolution of all things
in pure duration is there, forming around the intellectual con-
cept properly so called an indistinct fringe that fades off
V: ("Creative Evolution.” p. ^0)
( Ibid p. 40)
( Ibid pp. 40,45)
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into darkness. Mechanism and finelism agree in taking account
only of the bright nucleus shining in the centre. They for-
get that this nucleus has been formed out of the rest by con-
densation, and that the whole must be used, the fluid as well
as and more than the condensed, in order to grasp the inner
movement of life. — pure intellect is a contraction, by con-
densation, of a more extensive power."
Bergson studies the evolution of intellect in the general
process of universal evolution. The entire universe has
evolved in the direction of vertebrate life in general and
human intellect in particular. In this general evolution for-
ward into intellect, life has had to abandon many elements
which were incompatible with vertebrate structure and intel-
lectual organization and has compelled the abandoned elements
to go along other lines of development. It is in the totali-
ty of these elements together with human intellect that we must
endeavor to find intellect proper and grasp it in its true na-
ture of vital activity. This means "that som.ething of the
whole, therefore, must abide in the carts; and this common
element will be evident to us in some way, perhaps by the pre-
sence of identical organs in very different organisms."
Here is the supremely Eergsonian idea, — that of an ori-
ginal impetus of life, passing from one generation of germs to
the following generation of germs through the developed organ-
isms which bridge the interval between the generations. This
it ("Creative Evolution." pp.45,46) nn (Ibid c.54)
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impetus sustained along the lines of evolution among which it
gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least
of those which are regularly passed on, that accumulate, and
create new species. In general, when species have begun to
diverge from the common stock, they accentuate their diver-
gencies as they progress in their evolution. Yet, on certain
definite lines they may evolve identically; in fact, they must
do so if the hypothesis of a common impetus be accepted. Na-
ture’s simple act divides itself automatically into an infinity
of elements which are found to be co-ordinated to one idea.
After a thorough discussion of the divergent directions of the
evolution of life, Bergson concludes:
’’The evolution of life, receives a clearer meaning,
although it cannot be subsiimed under any actual idea . It is
as if a broad current of consciousness had penetrated matter,
loaded, as all consciousness is, with an enormous multiplicity
of interwoven potentialities. It has carried matter along to
organization, but its miovement has been at once infinitely re-
tarded and infinitely divided. On the one hand, indeed, con-
sciousness has had to fall asleep, like the chrysalis in the
envelope in which it is preparing for itself wings; and, on the
other hand, the manifold tendencies it contained have been dis-
tributed among divergent series of organisms which, moreover,
express these tendencies outwardly in movements rather than
internally in representations. In the course of this evolution,
while some beings have fallen more and more asleep, others have
OP
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more and more completely awakened, and the tornor of some has
served the activity of others. But the waking could be ef-
fected in two different ways. Life, that is to say conscious-
ness launched into matter, fixed its attention either on its
own movements or on the matter it was passing through; and it
has thus been turned either in the direction of intuition or
in that of intellect. On the side of intuition, conscious-
ness found itself so restricted by its envelope that intuition
had to shrink into instinct, that is, to embrace only the very
small portion of life that interested it; and thus it em.braces
only in the dark, touching it while hardly seeing it. On this
side, the horizon was soon shut out. On the contrary, con-
sciousness, in shaping itself into intelligence, that is to say
in concentrating itself at first on matter, seems to external-
ize itself in relation to itself; but, just because it adants
itself thereby to objects from without, it succeeds in moving
among them and in evading the barriers they oppose to it, thus
opening to itself an unlimited field. Once free, moreover, it
can turn inwards on itself, and awaken the potentialities of in-
tuition which still slumber within it.
**From. this point of view, not only does consciousness ap-
pear as the motive principle of evolution, but also, among con-
scious beings themselves, men comes to occupy a privileged place.
Between him and the animals the difference is no longer one of
degree, but of kind.”
«• (”Creative Evolution.” pp. 181, 18S)
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From the above it seems evident that Bergson means that
we do, by use of the intuitions, actually enter into life it-
self as we could not do by mere process of intellect. Phil-
osophy thus introduces us into the spiritual life and it also
reveals to us the relation of the life of the snirit to the
material body. Bergson brings out his thought with great
power in one of the most beautiful passages to be found in
modern philosophical literature. We quote it almost entire.
’’Philosophy introduces us thus into the spiritual life.
And it shows us at the same time the relation of the life of
the spirit to that of the body. — Life as a whole, from the
initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear
as a wave which rises, and which is onposed by the descending
movement of matter. On the greater part of its surface, at
different heights, the current is converted by matter into a
vortex. At one point alone it passes freely, dragging with
it the obstacle which will weigh on its progress but will not
stop it. At this point is humanity; it is our privileged
situation. On the other hand, this rising wave is conscious-
ness, and, like all consciousness, it includes Potentialities
without number which interpenetrate and to which consequently
neither the category of unity nor that of multiplicity is ap-
propriate, made as they both are for inert matter. The m.atter
that it bears along with it, and in the interstices of which it
inserts itself, alone can divide it into distinct individuali-
ties. On flows the current, running through hum.an generations.
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subdividing itself into individuals. This subdivision was
vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear
without matter. Thus souls are continually being created,
which, nevertheless, in a certain sense pre-existed.
Finally, consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom it-
self; but it cannot pass through matter without settling on
it, without adapting itself to it: this adaptation is whet
we call intellectuality; end the intellect, turning itself
back toward active, that is to say free, consciousness,
naturally makes it enter into the conceotual forms into which
it is accustomed to see matter fit. It will therefore al-
ways oerceive freedom in the form of necessity; it will al-
ways neglect the nart of novelty or of creation inherent in
the free act; it will always substitute for action itself an
imitation artificial, approximative, obtained by compounding
the old with the old and the same with the same. Thus, to
the eyes of a philosopher that attempts to reabsorb intellect
in intuition, many difficulties vanish or become light. But
such a doctrine does not only facilitate speculation; it gives
us also more power to act and to live. For, with it, we feel
ourselves no longer isolated in humanity, humanity no longer
seems isolated in the nature that it dominates. All the
living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous
push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides
animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is
one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of
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us in an overwhelming charge able to beet down every resistance
and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.”
According to Bergson the history of philosonhy is likewise
an evolution which we can understand only as we follow out the
main ideas which appear and reappear throughout the course of
human progress. Dogmatism and vituperation are not worthy
aids for the seeker after knowledge. Bergson sees, in all
phases of thought, truths which tend in the direction of the
ultimate and perfect truth.
Bergson notes that there is a unity among sciences and
that no one of them can be studied apart by itself. This sug-
gestion has much the same general trend as is seen in Bowne's
discussion of the unity of World-Ground and indeed must be so
understood. We reason about the whole in order to have an
adequate understanding of the parts. The philosopher, after
a complete rejection of scientific sym-bols sees and experiences
life in the pure flux of duration. Thus he may come to under-
stand universal evolution.
With regard to science as such, Bergson teaches that we
do not need to enter the dynamic; we can keep to time as static;
but in order to understand a growing world, we must put vitali-
ty and the feeling of duration into our concepts. We must be
no longer mere geometricians, we must be thinkers in terms of
the dynamic and vital. Life and consciousness reveal the truth
as it cannot be found elsewhere. To quote :-
(’’Creative Evolution.” pp. 968-271)
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’’When once we have grasped them (Life and Consciousness)
in their essence by adopting their movements, we understand
how the rest of reality is derived from them. Evolution an-
pears and, within this evolution, the progressive determina-
tion of materiality and intellectuality by the gradual con-
solidation of the one and of the other. But, then, it is
within the evolutionary movement that we place ourselves, in
order to follow it to its present results instead of recom-
posing these results artificially with fragments of themselves.
Such seems to us to be the true function of nhilosophy. So
understood, philosophy is not only the turning of the mind
homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the liv-
ing principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative
effort; it is the study of becoming in general, it is true
evolutionism, and consequently the true continuation of science
provided that we understand by this word a set of truths
either experienced or demonstrated, and not a certain new
scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of the
nineteenth century around the ohysics of Galileo, as the old
scholasticism grew up around Aristotle.”
A thorough review of Bergson’s ’’Creative Evolution” makes
apparent the close connection between his theory of the know-
ing-process and the ultimate question of the world -orocess
.
Bergson has aimed in his brilliant book to follow the actual
genesis of mind in the cosmological order of evolution. The
(’’Creative Evolution.” pp. 369,370)
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necessity that the Whole be studied in order to grasp any of
its parts leads him to a careful discussion of the static
character of the concepts of the instrument of language and
reveals to him the fact that such a study of the Whole demands
new and vital concepts that shall be more than intellectual;
concepts that have in them the full quality of the intuitions.
The rise of human intelligence is traced through the long line
of the creative evolution of the jllan Vital and the develop-
ment of the mechanism of thought is worked out from the stand-
point of Intuition.
The ultimate bearing of ’’Creative Evolution” upon cos-
mology is fairly evident. Bergson manifests a lack of inter-
est in the religious aspect of the entire problem of cosmology
and shows no decided preference for Theism as does Bowne.
Bergson never discloses his goal. From much of the style as
well as the logic of his position, we are led to believe, how-
ever, that we may expect from Bergson a further and final work,
I
of more full theistic import. The Elan Vital is creative, is
intelligent and is described in terms which stamp it as ner-
sonal. But Bergson’s paramount interest is in world-process-
es and is not, as with Bowne, centered about a theory of the
World-Ground as Infinite Personality. The demand for a the-
istic grounding of thought does not openly obtrude itself in
the pages of Bergson. It seems nevertheless a fair contention
that he is implicitly theistic, but that he has not fully
thought out the import of his system. For some unexplained
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reason the religious interest is lacking.
Bergson aims at a further development of the Kantian
system which so clearly demonstrated the reactive nature of
thought and the unitary character of the self together with
the categories as internal forms of the thought process. With
Bergson the categories of space and time are interpreted by a
process of intuition which process finds its ground in a sym-
pathetic treatment of the natural sciences. To the epis-
temology of Kant and his successors, which was formed under
the dominating influence of the concepts of matjiem.atical science,
are added the new epistemological conceptions realized in the
intuitions. The validity of the subjective factors of thought,
when considered in conjunction with the findings of intuition-
alism leaves no implicit question of relativity. Bergson
demonstrates the possibility of thought actually entering real-
ity and thereby proves the validity of the thought process.
Unlike Kant, (and in a measure Bowne,) Bergson does not stop at
the ’’Practical Peason" even though that be found in the demands
of life, but aims to reach absolute knowledge. There is no
trace of acknowledged relativity in the system of Bergson.
Y/e cannot escape the conviction that there is need for a
conception of knowledge which lays due stress upon the truth-
finding power of the intuitions. If to this concention of
knowledge there is added the rational demand for Infinite
Personality as ground of all truth, as in the system of Bowne,
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then philosophy ministers to knowledge and to the deeper de-
mands of the soul. Only so can philosophy be made practical.
-ab Tacraeb arfi' oi' fens agbslwonl oi’ a'leisinl®-' 'v;f!rro3oiiri<5 nefli
. Ibc i 3'iff aba.Ti ecf \^ri<J08 o -Cider nao o3 ’-^InO «Ii;o3 &d^ io sbns®
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOWT^E, BORDEN PARKER.
’’The Essence of Religion.”
Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. IPIO.
’’The Immanence of God.”
Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1905.
’’introduction to Psychological Theory.”
New York. harper. 1887.
’’ivant and Spencer.” A critical exposition.
Boston. Houghton, wiifflin & Co. 191P.
’’ibe taphysics . A Study in Rirst Principles.”
New York. Harper. 1898.
’’Personalism. ”
Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The N. W. Harris
Lectures at Northwestern University for 1907.
’’The Philosophy of Heroex-’t Snencer.”
New York. Nelson & Phillips. 1876.
’’Philosophy of Theism.”
New York. Harner &. Co. 1387.
’’The Princinles of Ethics.”
New York. Harner. 189^.
’’Studies in Christianity.”
Boston. Houghton, Mifflin 3: Go. 1900.
’’Theism.” Comprising the Deems Lectures for inQp.
New York. American Bock Go. 190*^. A review
and extension of the preceding.




3 IfT eH .
.?OPI
T7&ive'i A
OfPI *oD ^ ^ lolrfguoH noX’soa
,oO

















W . H 9 fix
.vcei no't
,oO A n.i.I'jlxM ,no^fl-^i/oA .noJacd
'^J-lfe'i9vxnU ri'Xo.tsswrii'ioM is 08~i-'i09J.
»
.^vei
'.isonoac X"i’90'xeH Po •'rfcosoi irl4 sxll.
^
.aoilllrH h no'dlQl^. .XTc'f W9>^
,^801
, fiTci 1 $ dT 4 0 V df.ro a o I x ri4 ”
,cD £ 0 800 eH .dl'ioY wo’A
.?pe.i
''.goid.tJI *^0 seloXonrn'^ edT'"




.cO X n.ii.P'^xM ,no.tffeLfoH .noX’acS
8STLf;^&eJL amesCI ofl-t j^niei'tnmov ".araiorfl’
.opof .oC Aooa n-^oinsmA -AnLoiT wew
.jjrtxfciooa'xq ©fiJ 'to noian©.tX9 bn.o
.©gbolwonxi bns Jfi^uoclT lo ^'loeriT”
,VP8I ,'tori'~is%h •Aio/ w©^*
1
BERGSON, HENRI LOUIS
”Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience.”
Translated under the title ’’Time and Free Will”.
F. L. Pogson. London. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd.
(Library of Philosophy) 1910
”Matiere et memoire. Essai sur la relation au corps
a I’esprit.”
"Matter and Memory.” Authorized translation by
Nancy Margaret Paul and W, Scott Palmer.
London. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd. 1911.
(Library of Philosophy) 1911.
"Introduction a la Metaphysique.”
"An Introduction to Metaphysics.” Translated by
T. E. Hulme. Authorized edition.
New York and London. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. The
Knickerbocker Press. 191P.
"L’Evolution creatrice."
"Creative Evolution.” Authorized translation by
Arthur Mitchell,
New York. Holt <Sc Co. 1911.
.aiUOJ laWlH ,W03D>lS£i
”
.oorfDXoanoo al ab aataibemai seanaob aal lua xsaalj”
,’'XI1W 99*1^ bna anixT*’ al.tiX ariX 'xabrixi baXalsno'iT
.btJ ,o0 ^ niariosnarrnoa xi,3w3 .nobnoJ .no3§o^ .J .'*1
oroi { ^r^TOSoIXri^X lo
arrtob us noxX,Bla"£ si 'Xus iaasH .s'lioms'ii Xa e'xeX.tat^’"
’^vtxTTsa’ I a
ffox + slsae'it basXiodXrxA laXXxsM"
.'lamlBH X.t'*fD8 .’V bna rusX
»bXJ .oO A ni8ffo3n9rtro2 ns^3 .ncbroJ
,Iff?t ( vriaosoXliX'’" "^o •^la'icfiJ)
”.9npx3’irlaeX9>/ si s noi touoo'rinl”
Xd bsI.sIsna'TT ” .aoia^rffT-B-tsM o.l rtoilouboTl'nl nA’’
.noillbe besx'iofituA .araXifHl «3 .T
sdT .ano3 a’oisnXu^ .'X .0 .nobnoJL ohb ’4'toY well
.5XQI .389'T'X 'laiood'ioHcxji/i
”
.eox'iijsa'io fioidulova * d"
vcT noiXBXafXC'iX basx^oriXJbA ”.r!oi?uiova aviXaa'iO*'
.IXsrioXxM lUfiX^A
,XXpI .oO ii' dXcii •ji'io'i w3/i
WORKS ON HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Alfred Weber.
"History of Philosophy." Authorized translation by




"Moderne Philosophen.” Leipsig. O.R. Reisland. 1905.
"A History of Modern Philosophy."
Translated from the German by B. E. Meyers. S vol.
London. MacMillan & Co. 1900.





"History of Philosophy." Authorized translation by
James H. Tufts, Ph.D. Macmillan. 1911.
Uberweg, Friederick.
"Grundriss der ueschichte der Philosophie."
"History of Philosophy." Translated by George S.
Morris, A.M.
New York. Scribner, Armstrong &. Go. 1874
*^0 iHOiaia ^lo
^'xJdif'U bwi:'‘lXi4
vrf P.oic^iens'zi b^^tiodduA *' .\daoaoiiri^ lo




.iov > . 8 -l^^^^M
4 §ii 8aioJ ’* .nodqoaol i.ri4 ©mcsboM*'
nisiJcM 'io ’^'to.+ aXH A”
i *S xd nBnrtQO srio .TiOI'I 5ej aXan.i3‘iT
,oi) nsIiiiwbfiM .no5noJ







.SfXnrroscI trX^' *i9b f jiOP.sO”
Xd rroii £siar*B*x.? b©siT;o.'iX«jA ' .ij.'laosol irf'X lo
,Iiei .riBlIliroBM ,C{.1^ ,s.tltjT .H gOinsU
.ilci'iebsi'i'fi tjiSW'ivjcfLr
’•
,9jirirroeoIWX 'leb eir(oiflc89»; "isb eei^fonuiu”
.a sj'ToeO beXFlanfixP ” . v;/1qo?.oXiiH lo ^c^Ow+ 2 .:A’‘
,j.A tailiOiv:
.oO A ^rcoiXEarcA *'ional*ioa .x'lox W9>i
OTHER works read AND CONSULTED
Kant, Immanuel.
**Critik der reinen Vernunft.”
^Critique of Pure Reason.*’ Translated by F. Max
Muller. Second edition revised.
New York. The MacMillan Company. 1907.
Baldwin, James Mark.
”Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.” Article
on Epistemology.
Sheldon, H. C.
”Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century.”
New York. Eaton & Mains. 1907.
Ward, James.
’’Naturalism and Agnosticism.” Gifford Lectures
1896-8.
i-ondon. Adam and Charles Black. 1906.
Hocking, William Ernest.
’’The Meaning of God in Human Experience.”
New Haven. Yale University Press. 1912.
Caird, Edward.









Boston. The Pilgrim Press. 1912.
.asTJuat-uiO aHA bahow >iiHTo
. JlnunieV narfxei' ‘isjfb
xaM Z*? ba^sIanfi-iT ’'.noaaa?? eii;S lo aiipiJ'i'iiO*’
.boAiv^^t .n*^i^ifc9 br;ot>92 ^'loXIiai
.VCH'^I .vn^s^GioQ n/»XIxMo.s>i 9fiT .jf-icX" weK
.7/TRfc^ 89*-ijsi ,ni;wbl96r




, viintneO r11n99t6nrS4 ©fi.t ni lelXecirfll”
.VOPI " ,Bry.x6M I notsS .5fTt:oY
.3©aife»» ,b'iaW
g‘»'TyiroJ ” ,xT8icii 8on:siA brra m&iianuXe/r'
. 8-3021
.^OOX *.JioaX8 8.9iiCj£ri'0 bna aabA .nobno^
.ia©n*y2 .T<aiIXid ,gniiiooH
**
.©onoX'OfjxS HiimyH nX bot; lo ^ninaaid arfr*'
.2X91 .ss 9‘i4 '^ixg -movin'; aXsI .nsvah w»W
.b'xawbB .b-iiaO
”.Xns.Hl lo v;iXfi'^55c»Xlrf4 XsoXll'iS eriX’”
,f>00X .©aoilalosM .?'/oo£aXO
. bX O'! sH t g.n Ibl1oH
.’^rfrf03oXXi14 lo 3W9ldon4”
.30ri . ^i^rfsaaioO nairiMoeY .snoY w9'4
.X'^redneK ,-i9r?ne^2
”
.gala toning XsT f^’*
.3 ^ne-TieH
".noagnaS bna naAooS*'
ae&nS cij'igXx4 orlT .(ioX3o82 X 01
Le Roy, Edouard.
”Une Philosophie Nouvelle.” Henri Bergson.
Paris. Alcan. 1912.
”A New Philosophy of Henri Bergson.”
Translated from the French by Vincent Benson.
London. Williams A Nortgate. 1913.
Lindsay, Alexander Dunlop.
“The Philosophy of Bergson.”
London. Hodder A Stoughton. 1912.
”A Critical Exposition of Bergson* s Philosophy.
Stewart. John McKillan.
London. MacMillan A Co. Ltd. 1911.
.biBL/obi eJ
i:*TfieH ” .elXsvi/of'T oiriqosolirf'^ 9rfLT»'
.qxqi .n.eolA .sl'13'i
"
. ncajj-Toa J-inaH \fifJoBolid^ A”
nosnoS ^^rreeni.V eri.t aro'!*! slant'll’
.SICX .eX«5 i*xoW .-X- &3T.6iXXl^’ ,nobnoJ
.qoXiTfO'CI 'xebrijSxalA ^Y.s8bni4
’’.rroag'xoH lo YbqosoIid'X &di’*
,*>XGX .noJ^rtgtioXa 'labboti .aobnoJ
”
.
vdqoaoIXd'I a’rjoEgiaa lo noiiXaoqx^ J hoxXI'X'w
,n9i'Ii>:o[»i ndoo .X'lswaxa





















Not to be removed
from the Library
GAYLORD

